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Research Question 
Is urban core congestion pricing understood to improve street safety? 
● Is there evidence to indicate that congestion pricing implementation can improve safety? 
● Is street safety a significant element of the congestion pricing discourse?  
● If so, can we determine a consensus from that discourse as to whether congestion pricing 
reduces crashes and casualties on city streets? 
● Are there opportunities to create an integrated framework that draws from both 
congestion pricing and street safety conversations?  
Abstract 
This thesis explores cordon-style urban core congestion pricing as a street safety mechanism. 
With a handful of cities around the world having implemented different versions of cordon-style 
pricing, and conversations about street safety growing through the increasing adoption of Vision 
Zero in the United States and Europe, is there a nexus between these two policies? This research 
examines case studies of congestion pricing in London, Stockholm and New York; and assesses 
the relationship, both real and perceived, that is present in each city and in the literature between 
pricing and safety. It finds that safety is largely absent from the discourse of congestion pricing. 
But the presence of academic literature demonstrating significant safety benefits from pricing, as 
well as an understanding among some media and planning professionals that congestion pricing 
can be implemented in pursuance of safety ends, presents the opportunity for a variety of policy 
and implementation strategies that could move transportation policy frameworks simultaneously 
in the direction of both congestion pricing and street safety. This thesis concludes by proposing 
that safety be integrated into the discourse of congestion pricing, and that congestion pricing be 
considered for implementation as a Vision Zero policy.  
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The recent trend of Vision Zero (a policy framework and associated safety projects implemented 
with the intention of achieving zero deaths and serious injuries from vehicle crashes) adoption in 
Europe and the United States is elevating the conversation about safety on city streets. 
Meanwhile, congestion pricing conversations continue to surface, with London and Stockholm 
the most notable success stories of the past decade. New York City, having adopted Vision Zero 
two years ago, also has a history with congestion pricing, and is revisiting the concept with a 
new proposal on the table. With New York still searching for ways to move closer to zero deaths 
and serious injuries on city streets, can London and Stockholm provide lessons for New York 
about the safety elements of congestion pricing? 
 
This thesis considers the impact of congestion pricing in London and Stockholm on urban street 
safety and the way that those impacts are understood in practice and discourse. It finds that there 
are various opportunities for safety to play a bigger role in the discourse of congestion pricing, 
and will suggest that street safety benefits could provide a valuable framework for congestion 
pricing supporters – especially in New York City – to advocate for pricing implementation. More 
specifically, this paper will propose that:  
• safety be integrated more closely into the discourse of congestion pricing;  
• and that pricing be considered for implementation as a Vision Zero safety initiative. 
 
For the purposes of this research, “congestion pricing” (the name often used in the United States) 
and “congestion charging” (the name more frequently used in Europe), for reasons discussed 
below in the Methodology section, will refer to cordon-style road pricing schemes that encircle 
(as in Stockholm, where drivers pay any time they cross the cordon line) or envelope (as in 
London, where drivers pay once per day simply to be within the charging zone) an urban core or 
central business district.  
 




We will define street safety, in this paper, as the relative quantity and rate of crashes, fatalities, 
and injuries among all road and street users, including drivers, motorcyclists, bicyclists, and 
pedestrians. This is a data-oriented measure that does not consider other elements, such as 
comfort, feelings of security or protection, or overall well-being of residents, that could also be 
relevant to a holistic measurement of how safe streets truly are for people, but fall outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
The Need for This Research 
There is a somewhat well-established quantitative link between pricing and safety in the 
academic literature, indicating that there is a positive relationship between the two – particularly 
in London, where the recent research of Green et. al. thoroughly demonstrates positive safety 
effects from the London Congestion Charge (LCC) - but beyond that, what is the relationship of 
that academic research to the way in which congestion pricing is talked about in policy and 
planning circles? It is not clear. 
 
Indeed, some research has attempted to establish the need for stronger discursive links between 
congestion pricing and its corollary benefits. In a 2005 article looking primarily at London's 
congestion charge, Kenneth Small argues that transit advocates should be champions of road 
pricing, citing the "virtuous cycle" that benefits both congestion conditions and transit service. 
Research such as Wong et. al. (2005) and Berg and Young (1999) acknowledges that addressing 
the potential safety impacts of congestion pricing is critical in a pricing system’s design. But 
does safety actually show up in agency reports or media articles on pricing systems? Pricing may 
well be associated with a marginal decrease in the number of crashes or casualties, but is this 
reflected in the discourse of congestion pricing or of street safety?  
 
This research attempts to understand whether such discursive links are present and viable.  It 
finds that experts and stakeholders consider safety and pricing in the same discourse, often 
nominally linking the two; however, little emphasis is given to the nexus between these topics. 





In New York City, congestion pricing has long captured the imagination of economists and, at 
times, policy makers. But in 2008 a proposal backed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg failed to 
gather sufficient political and public support. With New York’s 2014 implementation of Vision 
Zero, street safety is becoming an increasingly important topic in the world of urban 
transportation planning and policy, and an emphasis on safety has a more receptive political and 
social audience than in years past. Planners may have the opportunity to connect these two often-
sought goals more closely for a better chance of success. Furthermore, the decreased traffic of an 
cordon-style congestion pricing scheme may have political and practical implications for 
transportation planners, by making the reclaiming of street space to allocate toward safer, less-
auto-oriented infrastructure simpler while providing opportunities for traffic volume reduction, 
modal shift, and a shift of the transportation paradigm – all of which provide opportunities for 
safer streets. 
 
Yet there have been no deliberate attempts to address street safety through pricing. Outside of the 
private vehicle insurance market, where drivers are penalized for unsafe driving, and civil 
penalties (e.g. speeding tickets) for traffic violations, there are really no instances of drivers 
paying for creating unsafe conditions for other road users. This thesis will discuss the evident 
power of road pricing to influence behavior change, and how that power might be applied to 
safety goals. 
Overview of Findings 
In case studies of London, Stockholm, and New York City, we discuss a brief history of 
congestion pricing implementation and/or proposals in those cities.  
 
The LCC, implemented by then-Mayor Ken Livingstone in 2003 amid widespread protest, saw 
immediate and substantial congestion reduction. Revenues were spent largely on bus service 
improvement, and partly on safety investments. Safety impacts at first were significant but 




largely concentrated within the CCZ. In recent years, the vehicle charge has risen considerably, 
but congestion levels have also risen, and are now at about the same level as prior to 
implementation. Meanwhile, London has used the LCC as an opportunity to significantly 
improve bus service throughout the city. 
 
Stockholm’s congestion charge was implemented in 2007 after a six-month trial. Congestion 
levels fell significantly immediately after implementation and have remained relatively constant 
ever since. Vehicle charges, too, remained constant until January 2016. Public acceptability for 
the charge was initially low but has since seen a marked increase. 
 
New York’s 2008 congestion pricing proposal was the culmination of decades of discussion 
among New York economists and policy makers. It proposed to charge drivers to enter the lower 
half of Manhattan, and promised to reduce congestion while creating a substantial new revenue 
stream for the struggling Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The proposal needed New York 
State Legislature approval, but failed to gain enough political momentum and never reached the 
State Assembly floor for a vote. 
 
A review of academic literature provides a thorough review of relevant literature about 
congestion pricing and its impacts on streets safety. A review of public discourse introduces the 
public discussion by way of a cursory look at social media connections between pricing and 
safety before examining media articles and other documents easily accessible to the public to try 
to understand how the topic has been discussed in the public domain. Congestion pricing reports 
and personal interviews are the foundation of a review of the professional discourse, which 
attempts to understand how planners, policy makers, advocates, and academics who come in 
contact with congestion pricing in their professional lives understand and discuss the link 
between congestion pricing and safety. 




Overview of Analysis and Discussion 
The research finds that safety is largely absent from the discourse of congestion pricing, although 
there are exceptions. In the academic literature, research is becoming more robust and more 
conclusive in indicating that there is indeed a significant effect of reduced crashes and casualties 
associated with congestion pricing. In the public discourse as well as the professional discourse, 
there are a mixture of understandings about what kind of impacts congestion pricing has or 
would have on safety, and in that way those discourses may be lagging behind the most recent 
findings from the academic literature.  
 
But there is also a handful of people who both understand the many indirect safety benefits of 
pricing, and argue that there are various opportunities to implement congestion pricing as a 
safety-oriented initiative. These findings present the opportunity to discuss the challenges and 
opportunities of considering pricing and safety in the same policy framework.  
 
Among the challenges are:  
• data reliability (how sure can we be that there is a positive and significant relationship?);  
• the limitations of comparing congestion pricing policies across different policy and 
implementation contexts;  
• disagreement over the relationship between congestion, vehicle speeds, and safety;  
• and the ever-present conundrum of how to “sell” a congestion pricing policy both 
politically and to the public.  
 
Opportunities for an integrated congestion pricing and safety framework include: 
• the positive externalities of congestion pricing spillover effects (that is, the potential 
positive impacts on safety outside of the charging zone, charging times, and charged 
vehicles) and reductions in crash and casualty rates;  
• opportunities to reclaim street space for more efficient (and ostensibly safer) modes such 
as public transit when vehicle volumes decrease, and to claim congestion pricing 
revenues for safety projects;  




• the potential for a change in the way that people conceive of, value, and prioritize 
transportation modes (a change in the transportation paradigm);  
• and the opportunity to take advantage of overlapping goals between congestion pricing 
advocates and the Vision Zero policy framework such that congestion pricing could be 
implemented as a Vision Zero initiative. 
 
Lastly, this paper discusses the implications of these findings, challenges, and opportunities for 
planners in various contexts, as well as suggestions for further research. 
 
Methodology 
This research will attempt to answer the following question:  How is the relationship between 
cordon-style, urban core congestion pricing and safety understood in the urban transportation 
planning discourse?  
 
And more specifically, is there evidence indicating that congestion pricing can reduce crashes 
and casualties on city streets? In the public and professional realms, is street safety a significant 
element of the congestion pricing discourse – and if so, can we determine a consensus from that 
discourse as to whether congestion pricing reduces crashes and casualties on city streets? 
And lastly, are there opportunities to create an integrated framework that draws from both 
congestion pricing and street safety conversations?  
 
These questions focus on urban core, cordon-style congestion pricing for three reasons. First, it is 
a fundamentally urban scheme, whereby drivers and their vehicles interact with other drivers as 
well as non-driving road users and a variety of urban obstacles and conditions. This makes urban 
core congestion pricing a dynamic issue of urban efficiency, livability, and transportation 
systems – the realm of planning. Second, urban core congestion pricing presents a valuable 
opportunity to incorporate consideration for the safety of those road users who are most 
vulnerable and least protected: pedestrians and cyclists. And third, New York’s 2008 proposal, if 




successful, would have been the first urban core congestion pricing scheme in the country. While 
other systems such as flexible-price toll roads and High Occupancy Toll highways exist in 
various locations in the U.S., they are primarily linear, intercity highways. If New York is to 
implement an urban core scheme in the future, we must look outside the U.S. for guidance. 
  
Data sources are varied, including social media, scholarly and publicly available academic 
research, newspaper and media articles, official reports, and surveys and interviews with policy 
makers, planners, academics and advocates. 
 
The methodology consists of four parts, each of which analyzes one element of the conversation 
on congestion pricing and safety, and they are outlined below. The first part is a series of case 
studies that introduce the history of congestion pricing implementation and/or proposals in each 
of London, Stockholm, and New York City, to understand the different contexts of each city and 
the politics and processes that played a part in their respective implementations or proposals. The 
second part is a review of the academic literature on the topic, in order to understand how 
empirical research has established a relationship between congestion pricing and street safety. 
The third part is an analysis of the public discourse, primarily focusing on media, to understand 
how the subject has been presented to the public. The fourth part is an analysis of the 
professional discourse that investigates the degree to which pricing and safety are connected in 
the conversations, reports, and personal opinions of professionals who work or interact with 
congestion pricing. 
 
The most appropriate and accessible methods and focuses of data collection varied by 
geography. London and Stockholm understandably dominate the academic literature, with 
numerous articles written about their respective congestion pricing systems. In New York, there 
is little academic literature since there is no extant pricing system; however, the media has 
followed the concept of pricing closely, especially during the debate that surrounded the 2008 
Manhattan cordon proposal. Fewer media sources were found in London, and in Stockholm 
language barriers prevented significant data collection about the public discourse. In the 




professional discourse, TfL’s Congestion Charge Reports offered a valuable data source for 
London, while Stockholm and New York professionals were accessible and willing to offer their 
perspectives, making interviews a heavy focus of research in those cities. 
Case Studies 
Case studies provide a brief history and background to the policy and implementation of 
congestion pricing systems in London, Stockholm, and the 2008 proposal in New York City. 
These cities were chosen for specific reasons – London and Stockholm for their geographic, 
cultural, and language accessibility as well as the relative success of their congestion pricing 
systems; and New York City as a contrast, where there has long been conversation about 
dynamic urban road pricing and never the implementation of a project, and where there remain 
future opportunities for implementation. New York City also presents the landscape of a recently 
changing discourse of street safety, that this paper seeks to explore and connect to congestion 
pricing.  
 
Other cities, such as Goteborg, Sweden; Singapore; and Milan, Italy, have also implemented 
urban core, cordon-style congestion pricing schemes. These could present interesting and 
relevant case studies, but were excluded from this research due to different issues, including  
insufficient geographic or temporal scale, substantial cultural and political differences, and/or 
language barriers. 
Academic Literature 
The review of academic literature review attempts to understand how the connection between 
congestion pricing and street safety has been studied in the research realm, and whether there is 
evidence indicating that safety may be an outcome of pricing. It attempts to demonstrate the 
evolution of the literature over the years. The findings are broken into three categories that 
sequentially build an argument that pricing can lead to safer streets, examining articles that 
demonstrate:  




1. A link between pricing and congestion relief  
2. A link between congestion relief and safety 
3. A direct connection between pricing and safety 
Public Discourse 
Public discourse research primarily includes analysis of newspaper and news media article 
searches. More superficially, it also looks at Twitter mentions of congestion pricing and safety, 
and Google Trends word searches to understand the degree to which congestion pricing and 
street safety are discussed concurrently in discourse available to and engaged in by the public at 
large. The findings are separated by city, with a heavy focus on the abundance of media 
discourse about congestion pricing in New York City and an attempt to analyze the trajectory of 
that particular media discourse in depth. 
Professional Discourse 
Professional discourse analysis is the most in-depth category of this research, in order to 
understand whether planners, policy makers, academics and advocates perceive a connection in 
theory and practice between congestion pricing and street safety. It employs two methods.  
 
First is a content analysis of congestion charging reports, which are available from TfL for the 
LCC for the years 2003 to 2008. 
 
Second are surveys and interviews of planners, policy makers, advocates and academics from 
each of the aforementioned three cities, to determine the extent to which safety is a consideration 
of their work and conversations about congestion pricing; and the extent to which congestion 
pricing is a consideration in their work and conversations about street safety. Interviews with 
academics are included here (and not in the “Academic Literature” section) because interview 
questions make an effort to primarily understand respondents’ personal opinions and 
understandings of the topic, as well as the way in which the topic is discussed in their 




conversations with peers and colleagues. In interviews with academic respondents, questions and 
conversations about respondents’ research was secondary and used only as background or 
supporting evidence.  
 
Recruitment of survey and interview participants was conducted through phone and email 
contact, through official websites, LinkedIn, and personal networking. Many of the respondents 
– approximately two thirds – were initially contacted on the recommendation of other planning 
professionals or a prior respondent. Surveys were administered through online forms, with data 
collected in an automatically aggregating database. Interviews were conducted in person, via 
telephone, and (in one case) via email, in order of priority and according to feasibility. 
Respondent names and titles are listed in Appendix A, but interview responses in the Findings 
section of this paper have been disaggregated from names and titles in order to provide a 
measure of protection of the identity of respondents. 
 
Interview subjects were asked questions about their understanding of congestion pricing and 
street safety, their perceptions of any link between the two, and about the possibility of 
integrating the two topics. Questions generally followed the template exhibited in Appendix B, 
but were targeted to the experience and expertise of the subject and evolved over time as this 
research developed. Interviews responses consisted of five London respondents, eleven 
Stockholm respondents, and seven New York respondents. One Stockholm planner, Daniel Firth, 
and a planner currently working in Kentucky, Amy DiCarlantonio, are considered London 
respondents as the majority of the interviews with each consisted of conversation about their 
experience working for or with Transport for London (TfL). A New York academic at Rutgers 
University, Robert Noland, is considered a New York respondent although part of the interview 
with him consisted of conversation about his experience with the LCC. 
 
Interview findings are categorized thematically in order to best synthesize perspectives on the 
recurring topics that came up in interviews and attempt to develop some consensus on each topic, 




and are bolstered by survey responses, which were not numerous enough to have statistical 
significance but rather serve to complement interview findings.  
Analysis 
The analysis section attempts to examine trends, patterns, and takeaways from the findings. 
There is no analysis of the case studies of London, Stockholm, and New York City, as these are 
intended to serve as context for the subsequent research findings. 
 
Case Studies 
This section will examine case studies of congestion pricing implementation and outcomes in 
London and Stockholm, as well as the failed attempt to pass a congestion pricing proposal in 
New York City. 
London 
Background 
London long had a reputation for congestion, with average network travel speeds averaging just 
8.6 mph and more than a third of time spent not moving (Green et. al. 2016). By the 1990s, 
average trip speeds were below that of the pre-automobile city of the nineteenth century. 
Average speeds were down to 8.6mph in 2002, compared to a nighttime uncongested speed of 20 
MPH. Public concern over congestion was high, with a 1999 survey identifying public transport 
and congestion as the two most "important problems requiring action" and ninety percent of 
London residents responding that "there is too much traffic in London" (Leape 2006 and Green 
et. al. 2016). 
 
At the time, a congestion charge began to be discussed, among concerns about "network" issues, 
the result of the practical impossibility of perfectly pricing each street and intersection according 




to individual demand. These concerns made pricing less attractive, and the charge that was 
ultimately implemented in London came to be referred to as a "blunt instrument" designed 
simply to make driving less convenient and public transport more attractive (Green et. al. 2016). 
Implementation 
The London congestion charging system was implemented in 2003 under the guidance of Mayor 
Ken Livingstone, amid widespread protest. It encompassed an eight square mile area of central 
London (Figure 1), and charged drivers of private and commercial vehicles a flat £5 per day fee 
to cross into the city between 7:00am and 6:30 pm on weekdays.  
 
Figure 1: Map of the London Congestion Charging Zone. Image source: Transport for London 
(2007).
 






The primary objectives of the charge were to discourage traffic congestion in the center of the 
city, incentivize transit use (Green et. al. 2016), protect the environment (Falcocchio and 
Levinson 2015), improve trip time reliability for car users, and make distribution of goods and 
services more reliable, sustainable, and efficient (Santos 2008).  
 
Revenues were intended to be utilized for reinvestment exclusively in London public transport 
(Green et. al. 2016), with the expected £130 million in revenue, prioritized toward, in order, 
transit, roads, safety, and cycling and walking facilities (Santos 2008). 
 
The system administers payment through the use of a network of cameras that are located along 
the boundary of the charging zone and record license plate images. The license plate images are 
sent to a central processing facility, where plate numbers are identified and bills sent to the 
vehicle’s owner (Kable 2010). Motorcycles, bicycles, buses and taxis are exempt and residents of 
the zone can receive exemptions and discounts (Green et. al. 2016). Since 2003, the charge has 
periodically risen; it is presently set at £11.50 (Transport for London 2016).  
 
In 2007, a new “western extension” was introduced to the charging zone, doubling the original 
area. The extension was accompanied by significant increases in bus service in the new zone. It 
led to an approximately 13% reduction in traffic. The western extension was withdrawn in 2011, 
the result of a change in political leadership and the perception of minimal additional benefits 
from the extension. 
Outcomes 
The outcomes of the congestion charge have been discussed primarily in terms of its congestion 
impacts, traffic composition change, revenues and revenue use, and other benefits (which have 
sometimes included safety). 
 




Congestion impacts in the first year of the charge were substantial enough to reduce the total 
distance driven by cars by 34%, with total distances driven by bikes, motorcycles, taxis, and 
buses increasing (Leape 2006). Traffic volume reductions greater than expected, with Vehicle 
Miles Traveled going down overall (Santos 2008). On balance the amount of time lost to 
congestion was reduced by nearly 30% (Transport for London 2005). Trip times decreased and 
journey time reliability increased, with the standard deviation of travel times decreasing 27% 
during the morning peak and 34% for return journeys. Average speeds increased from 8.9mph to 
10.4mph, a 17% increase (Leape 2006). 
 
By 2006 there were almost 70,000 fewer vehicles entering the charging zone compared to the 
number that had been entering each day before charging began, a reduction of 20% (Kable 
2010). The rate of congestion reduction, however, slowed by 2006, as more effective network 
capacity was reallocated to other users, most notably through bus service and bicycle and 
pedestrian facility improvements, and concurrent traffic management programs to reduce crashes 
(Santos 2008). 
 
Traffic composition changed as well, as private cars' share of vehicle mileage shifted from 
almost half of central London traffic to just over one third, a decrease of 34%. Commercial 
traffic decreased slightly, and there was a sharp rise in taxis (up 22%), buses (up 21%) and 
bicycles (up 28%) (Leape 2006). 
 
Both revenues and administrative costs have been substantial; thus net revenues have not been 
enormous. Moreover, revenues were lower than expected due to the high level of trip reduction 
(Leape 2006 and Santos 2008). Net revenues have been earmarked for, and spent primarily on, 
mass transit improvements, specifically the bus system (80%), and secondarily on road safety 
and bike/walk initiatives (20%) (Green et. al. 2016 and Falcocchio and Levinson 2015).  
 
Specifically, 11% of revenue was spent on road safety (Leape 2006): £5 million ($9 million in 
2008 dollars) out of £123 million ($228 million) of total revenues for the financial year 




2006/2007 were used for road safety campaigns and road safety cameras. £3 million ($6 million) 
were put toward walking and cycling (Transport for London 2007). The next year, £2 million 
($3.78 million in 2008 dollars) out of £137 million ($259 million) were used for the same 
purpose (Transport for London 2008). 
 
Other benefits discussed in analysis of the charge have been value of time to travelers multiplied 
by their time savings, value of greater predictability of trips, reduction in fuel costs because 
driving times are reduced, value of reduced vehicle emissions, and savings due to fewer road 
accidents (Santos 2008). Noland et. al. (2008) state that there is no overall effect on casualties, 
with safety benefits within the charging zone and charged modes outweighed by safety losses 
outside of the charged zone and modes. Santos (2008) claims that crash reduction is a “minor” 
benefit. According to data from TfL, crash and casualty rates declined consistently in London, 
particularly inside the charging zone and on the perimeter Ring Road, across injury severity 
classes (Figure 2), geographic areas (Table 1), and most modes (Figure 3). 
 




Figure 2: Reported personal injury crashes within the CCZ and the Inner Ring Road, during 
charging hours, 2001-2006. Image source: Transport for London (2007).
 




Table 1: Total reported personal injury crashes by area, 2001-2006. Source: Transport for 
London (2007).
 




Figure 3: Crash involvement by vehicle type within the CCZ, during charging hours, 2001-2006. 




In the years leading up to the 2002 national elections in Sweden, congestion charging was a non-
starter in the political realm. The major parties had all declared their opposition to the concept. 
But in 2002, a close finish between parties gave the Green Party bargaining power, and it pushed 
for a congestion charge in Stockholm. 
Implementation 
Stockholm’s congestion pricing trial was preempted by an expansion of public transit, and began 
with an experimental six month trial period, followed by a referendum. The 2006 trial period had 
been designed to end before elections were held, and in the referendum votes differed according 
to geography: Stockholm residents supported the charge, while suburban residents were in 




opposition (Lundberg 2016). Concerns were primarily political (urbanites in Stockholm benefit, 
while start up costs were paid by the national government) (Richardson and Bae 2008). After the 
referendum the Swedish government declared that they would make the congestion charge 
permanent.  
 
Stockholm’s system, overseen by the national Swedish Transport Agency, utilizes a variable 
time-of-day toll that charges drivers for each crossing of the cordon (as opposed to London’s 
system, which charges drivers once per day), with a maximum daily charge. The cordon 
surrounds central Stockholm including the island of Sodermalm (Figure 4). The charge is 
administered only during working hours on weekdays. In Stockholm, as in London, the primary 
purpose of implementation has been to reduce congestion, with transit promotion and 
environmental protection secondary purposes (Falcocchio and Levinson 2015).  
 









The system uses an electronic on-board vehicle tag and roadside sensors to identify vehicles as 
they enter the charging zone, and cameras identify vehicles without tags by license plates. 
Payment is made via direct debit, triggered by the tag sensors (Roadtraffic-technology 2016). 
 




Exempted vehicles include emergency vehicles, buses, diplomatic vehicles, disabled persons 
vehicles, military vehicles, hybrid or electric cars, motorcycles and mopeds, and foreign-
registered vehicles (Roadtraffic-technology 2016). 
 
Net revenues are returned to vehicle owners through tax rebates, with heavy investments from 
general funds made in transit and highway investments (Falcocchio and Levinson 2015).  
Outcomes 
Traffic volumes initially decreased, and have since remained relatively constant. The city has 
seen a 20% reduction in traffic congestion in the city center (Falcocchio and Levinson 2015), 
with no significant increases in congestion on nearby routes (except that attributable to 
population increases), negating concerns of negative spillover traffic externalities (Wilson 2012). 
About half of the volume reduction was the result of a switch to other modes, with the other half 
coming from trips that changed route or destination, or were eliminated altogether. The price 
stayed the same until January 2016 (Transport Styrelsen 2016), when it increased in conjunction 
with the addition of an extension along the western edge of the zone. 
 
Since being permanently implemented in 2007 opposition to the charge has steadily decreased 
(Lundberg 2016), with public acceptability for the scheme now at 70%, (up from 36% in 2006), 
suggesting that the benefits of are now widely accepted (Wilson 2012). 
 
The charge has resulted in up to a 14% reduction in emissions (Falcocchio and Levinson 2015), 
and also was associated with a decrease in crashes within the toll zone of up to 10% (Richardson 
and Bae 2008).  






In the United States, road pricing predates the automobile. Bridges, tunnels, and turnpikes used 
tolls to fund construction, maintenance, and operations of the facility. But by the early 20th 
century, state and federal vehicle fuel taxes had become the primary funding source for roads. 
That doesn’t mean that road tolls went away, however.  
 
In the New York area, there is a long history of pricing on roadways and crossings, and the story 
is contentious and complicated. In 1910, when bridges entering Manhattan cost five cents to 
cross, Mayor William Jay Gaynor was shot in the throat in an assassination attempt by a 
disgruntled former City employee. The Mayor survived, and a few months later he removed the 
five-cent tolls from the four East River bridges. Those bridges have been free ever since, and any 
attempts to charge motorists who cross them has met with brutal political hostility. While "there's 
never been a serious connection drawn between the assassination attempt and Gaynor's tolling 
policy," former Department of Transportation Deputy Commissioner "Gridlock" Sam Schwartz 
has said, "I'm suspicious" (Naparstek: the Political Bloodbath 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels were tolled as soon as they opened in 1927 and 
1937, respectively. Both cost fifty cents. Merritt Parkway between New York City and New 
Haven had toll stations by 1938, as did parkways in Westchester and Nassau Counties 
(Falcocchio and Levinson 2015). In 1973, Mayor John Lindsay and Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller approved a $0.50 toll on the East and Harlem River bridges, in an effort to bring the 
city into compliance with the new Clean Air Act. The plan met with hostility from the taxi 
industry, and threats from the trucking industry, and the plan was nixed. When a lawsuit was 
filed against the city by the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1975, the federal government 
moved to enforce the toll, but New York legislators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Elizabeth 
Holtzman instead amended the Clean Air Act, letting New York City off the hook for 




implementing the tolls in exchange for funding their transit system by other means (Schwartz 
2008).  
 
In 1980 proposed legislation from Mayor Ed Koch and Deputy DOT Commissioner Sam 
Schwartz planned to charge people in single-occupancy vehicles for entering Manhattan during 
morning rush hours (Schwartz 2015). The legislation was passed in the City Council but 
ultimately the City was sued over the proposal by opponents that included AAA and the 
Metropolitan Parking Association (a parking garage operators' lobby). The proposal was 
ultimately overturned in court in the case Automobile Club of New York v. Koch, on the 
grounds that the City did not have the authority to toll its bridges (Schwartz 2008, Naparstek 
2006). In the court's decision, only the state had the authority to discriminate between single-
occupancy and carpool vehicles - and the governor, Hugh Carey, was not willing to take up the 
issue for fear of provoking AAA (Schwartz 2015). The precedent was thus set in New York City 
that any tolls on East River bridges must be approved by the State legislature. 
 
In 1987 Schwartz introduced a similar plan, and opponents from the business community 
marched on City Hall in protest (Schwartz 2015). 
 
By 1991, as discussed later in the Public Discourse section, Moynihan appeared open to the idea 
of road pricing as a way to both reduce congestion and finance maintenance and repairs of road 
facilities (Senate Hearing 1991), but there was little movement on the issue. 
2008 Proposal 
In 2006, New York was awarded federal funding from USDOT for a congestion pricing 
proposal. In response, as part of his administration’s PlaNYC, Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
proposed a three-year pilot congestion pricing program for Manhattan below 86th Street, a 
cordon system that would have charged cars $8 to enter and trucks $21. Taxis, transit vehicles, 
emergency vehicles, and others would have been exempt. The system would have been in effect 
only during work hours on weekdays. It planned to use “a combination of radio frequency 




identification technology and cameras to capture the license plates of vehicles without electronic 
tolling tags” (Schwartz 2008). 
 
The proposed system intended to reduce congestion, raise revenue, and reduce environmental 
impacts of vehicle travel. It would have reduced vehicle trips into Manhattan by about 7%. 
Arguments against the proposal included inequity, parking, and length of payoffs. Opponents 
argued that the system would target the poor who commute to Manhattan by car (although the 
authors argue that very few lower-income people travel by car into Manhattan); that people 
would park on the border of the cordon and walk/ride into the city to avoid paying the charge 
(authors contend that a simple residential parking permit could avoid this problem); and that 
transit improvement plans were factored into the request, but would take years to implement 
(Falcocchio and Levinson 2015). 
 
In 2007 Mayor Michael Bloomberg took up the cause, spurred in part by competition with 
London, which had implemented its congestion charging system in 2003. The proposal was 
supported and approved by the City Council but, despite public support (a Quinnipiac poll 
showed New York City voter support at 67 percent and statewide support at 60 percent if the 
revenue was directed to transit), the New York State Assembly (which needed to authorize the 
City's collection of tolls) declined to vote on the measure, dooming the proposal and losing the 
federal funding (Schwartz 2008). 
 
In a compromise deal, in 2007 the State Legislature formed a Commission to compare 
congestion pricing to other potential policies. In early 2008, the Commission released its final 
recommendation, proposing a congestion pricing plan that scaled back Bloomberg's proposal, 
with a smaller charging zone of Manhattan below 60th Street and other changes (Schwartz 2008 
and 2015). 
 




Some commentators observed that gaining approval of pricing in New York City would require 
changing how motorists view the effect of pricing on them personally; pricing proposals needed 
to be perceived as benefiting drivers individually and not simply society at large (Schaller 2010). 
MoveNY 
In response to some of the criticisms of the Bloomberg proposal, an advocacy group headed by 
Sam Schwartz, called MoveNY, proposed a new plan, called the MoveNY Fair Plan, in February 
of 2015. The plan calls for a logical redistribution of toll prices on New York City’s 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority bridges, placing new tolls on the previously uncharged 
East River Bridges and evening out (in most cases decreasing) prices for outer-borough bridges. 
The plan (discussed in more detail in the Public Discourse section, below) anticipates significant 
congestion, revenue and equity outcomes, as well as making a minor nod to expected street 
safety improvements. According to many observers, the future of MoveNY is dubious due to 
multiple political barriers (Komanoff 2016 and Carry 2016). Schwartz himself is prepared for the 
potential for failure of MoveNY. He knows that when space is given to drivers for free, demand 
is infinite, and as a result congestion will continue to worsen - but also that drivers are loathe to 
relinquish that space (Schwartz 2015). 
 
The Academic Literature 
History of Congestion Pricing in the Literature 
Congestion pricing is a concept that has had planners, economists and policy makers talking for 
decades. It has been advocated primarily as an efficient means to reduce road congestion 
(Eliasson 2008A). The conversation has been largely limited to the theoretical, with notably little 
action on the ground. Within the past fifteen years, however, a handful of urban, cordon-style 
congestion pricing systems have been implemented, offering the opportunity to analyze their 
impacts using real-world data instead of hypothetical models.  





The concept of charges to bring consumer prices into line with social costs dates back to Pigou, 
with their application to road congestion first discussed by Walters and Vickrey in the 1960s, 
who emphasized the need for drivers to pay directly for the costs they impose on other drivers, as 
an incentive to use road space efficiently (Green et. al. 2016).  
 
In 1963, Columbia University economist William Vickrey condemned pricing practices in urban 
transportation as irrational, out of date, and conducive to waste, noting that in nearly any other 
situation with a peak load, rates charged for that peak period were different than for off-peak.  
While he found transit fare structures seriously lacking, he lamented that pricing for the use of 
urban streets is nonexistent, and proposed that drivers on urban streets be charged. He talked 
about how hotels and airlines raise prices at peak demand periods, and suggested a similar 
arrangement for private automobiles, which were spatially inefficient yet occupying the most 
valuable space in the city. He called the idea congestion pricing (Schwartz 2015).  
 
In New York City, Vickrey identified two primary urban street pricing issues: East River 
crossings and peak hour underpricing. He pointed to New York's East River crossings as the 
height of pricing perversity, admonishing the City for making old bridges free to cross while 
charging tolls for newer tunnels. He argued that the setup simply exacerbated congestion and 
maintenance issues on the old bridges and their approaches. Meanwhile, underpricing of roads 
was most pronounced at peak hours, when competition for street space is so high that drivers 
essentially never come close to paying the true cost of street use (Vickrey 1963). 
 
Singapore’s system, the Area Licensing Scheme, was first instituted in 1975, when drivers 
entering the central business district were charged one dollar, immediately reducing the use of 
private cars within the business district by 73%. The pricing scheme has been accompanied by a 
suite of transportation demand management strategies over the years, including strong 
restrictions on vehicle ownership and high costs imposed on parking construction and use, which 
have helped to reduce driving in the city (Enoch 2004). Singapore’s pricing system has since 




been tinkered with, with encouraging results: although morning peak hour traffic has consistently 
increased since 1975 (along with significant increases in employment and total number of cars in 
the city), as of 2007 congestion was still 31% lower than before the charges were introduced 
(Schuitema 2007).  
 
In the early 1990s, there was political conversation in the U.S. at the national stage about 
congestion pricing, with U.S. Senators discussing its viability at a transportation subcommittee 
hearing and alluding to its eventual implementation on urban highways (U.S. Senate Hearing 
1991). 
 
As of the late 90s, some research began to note the growing dialogue about congestion pricing in 
the United States (Berg and Young, 1999). By 2008, American transportation researchers 
Schwartz et. al. labeled congestion pricing as the "holy grail" for transportation engineers, with 
the potential to reduce congestion, lower energy consumption, and decrease air pollution while 
improving transit. The US DOT, according to Schwartz, stated at the time that "there is 
consensus among economists that congestion pricing is the single most viable approach to 
reducing congestion and creates a financial relationship between the cost of highway travel and 
the cost of congestion." Schwartz noted that other transportation modes (such as air travel and 
intercity rail) use demand or distance-sensitive pricing. 
 
In 2003, London introduced its congestion charging experiment, which Banister (2003) 
described as "the most radical transport policy to have been proposed in the last 20 years." 
Research has praised it for providing the opportunity for congestion pricing research to move 
from abstract modeling to measuring on-the-ground results (Schuitema 2007).  
 
The Stockholm system, like London’s, has given researchers the opportunity to measure the 
impacts of congestion pricing on traffic, congestion, and travel behavior. Moreover, it is notable 
that the policy that set the system in place survived a complicated political and legal process and 
a dedicated referendum. Although initially deemed “the most expensive way ever devised to 




commit political suicide,” the system was ultimately a success, enjoying wide public and 
political support (Eliasson 2008A). 
 
Much of the literature around congestion pricing has focused on implementation, with political 
feasibility a primary concern. There is a long history of opposition to congestion pricing, with 
successful implementation in Milan and Stockholm and failed attempts in New York City, 
Manchester, and Edinburgh all meeting with political resistance (Green et. al. 2016). Schuitema 
(2007) discusses the challenges of implementing congestion pricing, indicating that primary 
among them is public opposition, as the public will seldom assent to being charged for 
something which was previously free. He suggests that government address the public’s 
concerns head-on, creating a two-way dialogue with the public that explains the purpose of 
congestion pricing while making the government aware of major concerns.  
 
William Vickrey expected effects of urban street pricing to include lessened congestion, better 
distribution of travelers between different modes (and specifically better bus service), change in 
land use and development patterns, and property values. While he advocated for space 
economizing modes of transport for better spatial efficiency, he neglected to mention the most 
space-efficient street users: cyclists and pedestrians. While these modes are highly spatially 
efficient, cyclists and pedestrians are also particularly vulnerable on urban streets. Critical to the 
successful promotion of these modes, then, is ensuring their safety. 
Establishing a Relationship Between Congestion Pricing and Street 
Safety 
The literature of congestion pricing and street safety links the two phenomena in two ways: 
indirectly and directly. First, we will look at the indirect linkage in the literature, by observing a 
positive relationship between congestion pricing and traffic congestion reduction, and 
subsequently observing a positive relationship between traffic congestion reduction and street 
safety. This is the first realm of research we will discuss, as it establishes a baseline argument for 




the impact of congestion pricing on street safety and has direct implications for the causes of the 
relationship.  
 
Second, we will investigate how the literature links congestion pricing and street safety directly, 
by measuring street safety effects under a congestion pricing system. Two primary 
methodologies are used to make these measurements: the inclusion of street safety measurements 
(like crashes) as part of a social and/or economic welfare analysis, and statistical methods such 
as the difference-in-difference model that compares crashes within the charging zone to other 
comparable locations. 
Linking Congestion Pricing to Reduced Congestion 
The majority of the congestion pricing literature establishes a positive relationship between 
congestion pricing and congestion reduction. This literature is well-established and based on 
more than a decade of experience with implemented congestion pricing schemes in London and 
Stockholm, and will only be reviewed briefly here. Literature coming out of New York generally 
reflects the same assumption that congestion pricing leads to congestion reduction, beginning 
with the econometric models of Vickrey and Walters and most recently reiterated in Falcocchio 
and Levinson (2015).  
 
Leape (2006) had similar findings in London, noting that the LCC reduced congestion and 
number of trips, with TfL estimating that just over half of the trips no longer being made 
transferred to public transit, one-quarter diverted around the charging zone, 10% shifted to other 
forms of private transport (predominantly taxis and bicycles) and around 10% either stopped 
traveling or shifted their trips to outside charging hours. 
 
Rich and Nielsen (2007), citing London’s decrease of congestion by 30% inside the toll ring and 
its subsequent socio-economic impacts, discuss findings a 2006 project that looked to improve 
on AKTA, the Danish component of the 2001 PROGRESS road pricing experiment that 
simulated road pricing for test subjects in various European cities. They find that a cordon-based 




urban core pricing system proposed for Copenhagen, as modeled, reduced vehicle kilometers 
traveled by 12.4% within the urban core. Among a number of proposed road pricing alternatives 
for Copenhagen, this was the most efficient scenario for reducing the number of travel trips, by 
producing the largest decrease in demand in proportion to the amount of charges paid by drivers. 
 
These studies often mention that, while cordon-style urban core pricing systems generally reduce 
traffic congestion for the urban core, results for areas outside the cordon zone are mixed. In Rich 
and Nielsen (2007)’s model for Copenhagen, the cordon zone reduced traffic congestion outside 
of central Copenhagen, but far less than in the central city. 
 
In Stockholm, Eliasson (2008) examined the congestion charging trial that preceded full 
implementation, finding that the system’s implementation was associated with reduced traffic, 
reduced congestion, and increased travel speeds and travel time reliability. It was also associated 
with fewer vehicle trips, with the number of vehicle kilometres driven in the inner city 
decreasing by around 16%. Outside the inner city, on the outlying approach roads and outlying 
streets, traffic volumes fell by just over 5%, caused in part by some mode shift to transit, but 
more by changes in destinations and trip frequency. 
 
Evaluating the trial through a cost-benefit analysis a year later, Eliasson (2009) finds that the 
charging system resulted in traffic reductions of about 100,000 fewer vehicles per day passing 
the cordon. He notes, among the challenges, that it is difficult to separate the effects of the 
charges from the effects of the transit extension that accompanied the charging system. And, 
having used data only from 2005 and 2006, Eliasson’s work, like others, measures only short-
term impacts. He concludes, however, that it “seems safe to assume that the traffic decrease was 
virtually exclusively caused by the charges.” 
 
Most recently, Falcocchio and Levinson (2015) identify, by various means, reductions of 
congestion by 20% in Stockholm and 26% in London, and the achievement of traffic speed 
targets of 45-65 km/h on expressways and 20-25 km/h on arterials in Singapore. 





None of the studies reviewed found urban core congestion pricing to be associated with an 
increase of traffic congestion within the charging zone. 
Linking Reduced Congestion to Safer Streets 
The reviewed literature found largely mixed relationships between reduced congestion and safer 
streets, indicating that it is not clear whether reduction of congestion is linked to increases in 
street safety.  
 
Noland et. al. (2004), in their study of road casualties in England, suggest that in urban areas, 
road designs and layouts lead to safety benefits independent of land uses. They conclude that 
changes in traffic flow (quantity of vehicles) can have a substantive effect on increasing 
casualties (that is, it's highly elastic). Furthermore their results suggest that increasing speeds in 
urbanized areas by reducing congestion may have adverse safety consequences, since urbanized, 
more densely populated areas have fewer traffic casualties (they say it may be due to reduced 
speeds, higher congestion, or lower design speeds) and areas with higher employment density 
have more traffic casualties (possibly due to increased street activity). Zhou and Sisiopiku (2007) 
also found more congested roads to be safer. 
 
Noland and Quddus (2005), in their spatial analysis of London, acknowledge the hypothesis that 
congestion may increase number and decrease severity of crashes, but their results are 
inconclusive. They suggest that congestion as a mitigator of crash severity is less likely to occur 
in urban conditions than on higher speed roads and motorways. 
 
Some research has proposed that a non-linear impact could be possible for the relationship 
between congestion and accident rates. Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006) suggest that a reduction 
of driving by one percent ought to decrease accidents by more than one percent. 
 




Quddus (2008), in his analysis of models of London crash data, was surprised to find that 
average speeds (using both a negative binomial model and Spatial Error Models) were negatively 
associated with casualties. The findings were inconsistent with the hypothesis that casualties 
would increase with an increase in average speeds. Indeed, the author contemplates whether this 
is the result of a research error or, in the case of fatalities and serious injuries, low sample sizes. 
He ultimately calls for further research but concludes that average speeds likely have no 
relationship with fatalities and serious injuries, and a positive relationship with slight injuries. 
 
Bilbao (2008, using various case studies to apply a theoretical model) and Schuitema (2007, 
assessing various opportunities for road pricing in the U.S.) assume positive relationships 
between congestion reduction and crash reduction in their inclusion of crashes as an element of 
social welfare. Bilbao’s study has a focus on recurrent congestion and its social cost externalities, 
in an attempt to quantify welfare losses arising from congestion on cross-town streets. He 
identifies crashes caused by congestion as a social welfare loss, particularly noting specific crash 
types such as shunts and side-on or front/side-on collisions that can be attributed to decreases in 
speed and to intersections with town street networks. His work assumes that such crashes would 
decrease in frequency if traffic density were decreased on roads, using monetary cost of these 
crashes (a valuation of the personal injuries and material damage caused according to the criteria 
used by insurance companies) to quantify their social cost. Bilbao recognizes that this approach, 
focused on number of crashes and fatalities, sometimes undervalues the social value of injuries. 
His estimates place the total cost of crashes on a cross-town road at €117,600 ($234,024 in 2007 
US dollars). 
 
Schuitema investigates whether road pricing can be a solution to the impacts of traffic 
congestion. He notes such vehicle crash-related costs as motorists’ pain, suffering and loss of 
life; employers’ health insurance, workers’ compensation, and workplace disruption costs; and 
non-motorists’ pain, suffering and loss of life via crashes with pedestrians and cyclists. 
Schuitema notes a common counterpoint to his argument of costs accruing due to congestion: 




that reducing congestion may reduce total crashes, while increasing the number of serious 
crashes due to increased average vehicle speed. 
 
Wang et. al. (2009) conducted a spatial analysis to measure the impact of congestion on 
frequency of accidents on a highway (the M25 in England). They found very little relationship - 
although they note that this may not be surprising as congestion is not usually considered 
dangerous on a highway. Other researchers find a negative relationship - that is, that congestion 
itself may be positively linked with safer streets. Wang et. al. (2009) studied the effects of traffic 
speeds in an area on casualties. Their findings suggest that increased average speed within a 
ward is positively associated with total fatalities and serious injuries.  
 
Other studies such as Levy et. al. (2010) and Liu et. al. (2010) are notable for the absence of 
safety in their evaluation of public health impacts of congestion. In what appears to be a trend in 
the public health literature that addresses congestion, many of these studies just look at pollution 
and noise impacts, while transportation policy literature attempts to identify economic and, 
occasionally as with Liu, community life. 
Linking Congestion Pricing Directly With Safer Streets 
A significant amount of research states or implies a relationship between congestion pricing and 
street safety. Some research attempts to directly quantify the impact of congestion pricing on 
street safety. Most finds a positive relationship (that is, congestion pricing is correlated with safer 
streets).  
 
When road pricing schemes are implemented on highways, studies such as Swan and Belzer 
(2013) have identified significant safety costs resulting from higher crash rates on alternate 
routes. Schwartz et. al. (2008), in an argument for congestion pricing as an economic benefit, 
state that the high volume of vehicles in central business districts produce numerous negative 
externalities, with public safety among them. 
 




Eliasson (2009), in his study of Stockholm’s 2006 congestion charging trial, summed up existing 
literature along with his own findings in stating that there was a net reduction of the number of 
traffic-related injuries inside the cordon by 5–10% (corresponding to 40–70 injuries per year). 
He cites other literature including Trivector (2006) and Nilsson (2000) in noting that a decrease 
of traffic volumes reduced the number of personal injury accidents within the tax cordon during 
the trial by 9–18%, in spite of the hypothesis among some observers that higher average speed 
could be expected to have raised accident numbers and increased the severity of accidents. 
 
Litman (2012) notes that research is limited, but concludes that available data indicate that 
pricing reduces crashes. In encouraging shifts to alternative modes, congestion pricing systems 
are likely to reduce neighborhood collision frequency by “approximately 19% (total) and 21% 
(severe)." 
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Parry and Bento (2002) appear to be the first to attempt to estimate the welfare effects of reduced 
crashes as a result of congestion charges, including "disutility from expected accident damages" 
in an equation to determine welfare cost-benefit. In their theoretical model, they find that the 
crash reduction portion of congestion pricing’s welfare gains accounts for over a quarter of the 
system’s welfare gains, with the crash risk lowered within the charging zone by 41%. Parry and 
Bento conclude that the welfare gains from crash reduction are “potentially important to include 
in a comprehensive evaluation of congestion taxes” but “difficult to pin down accurately” and 
offset to some extent by increased crashes on competing roads. 
 
Some studies analyze the costs and benefits of congestion pricing, but do not include the costs of 
road crashes into that analysis. Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005), for example, do not 
incorporate the costs and benefits of "accident savings." Leape (2006), however, does include 
reduced crashes in a social cost-benefit analysis in his study of the LCC.  
 




Rich and Nielsen (2007), in their modeling of proposed pricing schemes for Copenhagen, use a 
socio-economic benefits model based on pre-existing data from the AKTA, the Danish 
component of the 2001 PROGRESS road pricing experiment that simulated road pricing for test 
subjects in various European cities, to model externalities, including crashes, in an ArcGIS 
system. They find that there would be a decrease in crashes to the tune of €33 million per year in 
social benefit. They attributed the decrease in accidents to a stronger distribution effect: trips 
would be redistributed to safer roads as traffic moves off of urban streets to the Ring Motorway. 
Rich and Nielsen conclude that crashes, along with noise, are the primary external effects of 
congestion pricing. 
 
Eliasson (2008) measures street safety as an element of the environmental impact of congestion 
pricing. Noting that standard analyses of congestion charges take no account of effects for 
pedestrians and cyclists, he includes accessibility for drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians as traffic-
related indicators of welfare, with traffic safety overall rating as a plus-125 point contribution to 
welfare in his cost-benefit analysis. In 2009, Eliasson’s cost-benefit analysis of the Stockholm 
congestion charging system incorporates effects on traffic safety, finding a positive relationship 
between congestion pricing and street safety, with the reduction in traffic estimated to lead to a 
3.6% reduction in the number of traffic crashes in spite of increases in traffic speed. These 
numbers suggest that the number of people killed and severely injured on the roads is expected to 
decrease by approximately 14 per year, while the number of people slightly injured is expected 
to fall by just over 50 per year, yielding a significant social surplus. . 
Statistical Analysis 
Some literature was inconclusive or found neutral results as to the direct relationship between 
congestion pricing and street safety. Noland and Quddus (2005), in their spatial analysis of 
London, acknowledge that congestion pricing, if it indeed reduces congestion, may increase 
number and severity of crashes by increasing vehicle speeds. Their results are inconclusive.  
 




Noland et. al. (2008) used a negative binomial analysis to investigate the effects of London’s 
congestion charging on road casualties. They did not find a strong overall relationship, noting 
that while casualties within the charging zone decreased, there were increases in motorist 
casualties within Inner London (which encompasses the charging zone and uncharged areas). 
Within the charge zone, they found a decrease in motorist casualties, and an increase in cyclist 
casualties, as well as an associated effect of increased casualties of motorcyclists and cyclists in 
some areas outside the charging zone, suggesting that safety benefits for drivers may be offset by 
safety losses for bicyclists and motorcyclists. 
 
But some research was more conclusive. Quddus (2008), in a time series analysis of traffic 
crashes in Great Britain compared to the London CCZ, finds an average 33% reduction in 
crashes in the CCZ in each month after implementation of the charge. 
 
Li et. al. (2012) compare road casualties in London’s CCZ to other British cities (choosing the 
most appropriate comparison cities for each category of comparison, using Leeds to compare car 
casualties, Manchester to compare bicycle casualties, and Birmingham to compare motorcycle 
casualties) find a strong relationship between congestion pricing and street safety. As was 
common with other studies, they conclude that road casualties decrease while "two-wheeled" 
casualties increase, speculating that decrease in traffic flow and a better driving environment are 
the cause for safer conditions. Their concerns regarding cyclists were that cycle accidents 
increased as bikes and motorcycles replaced car use, and as such they recommend making sure 
there are adequate road safety measures to account for any modal shift to cycling. They note that 
a handful of other variables also affected casualties, including population, employment, 
deprivation, and road infrastructure and productivity. 
 
Green et. al. (2016) compare crash data for the LCC to data for the 20 next most populous cities 
in London, first using a simple numerical comparison (see Figure 5), then using linear spline 
estimates (see Figure 6).  




Figure 5: Crashes involving charged vehicles in charged times in the CCZ, compared to the 
control group of the next 20 largest cities in Britain. Image source: Green et. al. (2016). 
 
 




Figure 6: Spline regression for number of crashes - Charged vehicles, charged hours in CCZ, 
compared to the control group. Note: The discontinuous upper lines are the number of crashes 
per month in the LCC zone while the more continuous lower lines are the average number of 
crashes in the other 20 largest cities. Image source: Green et. al. (2016). 
 
 
The authors use a difference-in-difference analysis to measure both counts and rates of accidents 
within the charging zone in comparison to the next 20 largest cities in Britain. Areas of London 
outside the charging zone are deliberately excluded from the control groups, in anticipation of 
the congestion charge having safety impacts outside the charging zone, as well.  
 




As with other studies, the authors admit the methodological challenge of accounting for general 
nation-wide and London-specific declines in crashes and fatalities, and in response develop two 
methodologies.  
 
The first is a synthetic “cohort estimates,” taken from the 20 large cities, to extrapolate London’s 
pre-charge accident rates well past the implementation of the charge. In this way we can see how 
London’s rates compare to a hypothetical London that never implemented congestion charging.  
 
Second is a series of placebo tests, in which a hypothetical congestion charge intervention is 
applied to each of the control cities to test the policy impacts outside of the London context. 
Taking the findings of these tests into account, the authors conclude that the London CCZ is 
associated with a “large and meaningful decline” in the number and rate of crashes. 
 
Table 2: Relationship of serious and fatal injuries to the London Congestion Charge, in spillover 




They also make a deliberate attempt to examine not only the patterns of accidents within the 
charging zone, but also patterns among possible substitutions (of route, time, or mode). They 
find that the pattern of reduction of crashes holds true in adjacent times, areas, and for uncharged 




vehicles (contradicting earlier evaluations that only examine a shorter window and use different, 
what Green et. al. call "not suitable" controls). The “spillover” effect, in previous literature often 
predicted to have negative impacts on safety, in fact appears to have the opposite effect, to the 
tune of a 12% reduction of accidents in geographic spillover areas as well as spillover modes 
(specifically taxis, buses, motorcycles, and bicycles), as shown in Table 2. 
 
The authors attempt to address concerns about speed and severity of injuries (i.e., the hypothesis 
that reduction of crashes may be counterbalanced by more serious crashes due to higher speeds 
in the CCZ) by isolating serious injuries and fatalities from the crash data for the CCZ (Table 2). 
Their findings indicate that the congestion charge reduced the number of crashes resulting in 
serious injuries by 25% (43 per year) and crashes resulting in fatalities by 35% (4.3 per year). 
They estimate that this reductions aggregate to a cost avoidance (in terms of the costs of 
casualties, including pain, grief, and suffering as well as lost output and medical costs) of 
£28,849,659 per annum, noting that this estimate includes only the crash reductions taking place 
for charged modes, in the charging zone, during charging hours. 
 
The authors emphasize the study’s examination of accident rates per mile driven, to determine 
whether there is a more-than-linear impact of the LCC on accidents. They find that the LCC 
generated a "substantial reduction" in number of crashes as well as the rate of crashes. As a 
whole, the crash rate within the charging zone fell by about 22%, the authors state, with 
sequentially smaller but still significant decreases for each zone surrounding the CCZ. The 
Western Extension, an addition to the CCZ that was in effect from 2007-2010, also saw a smaller 
but still significant decrease in crash rates. 
 






Discussions of congestion charging online were tracked through Twitter using the search engine 
Mentionmapp, which tracks mentions of a requested hashtag. This was intended as a simple 
exercise to determine whether street safety and congestion pricing have any interplay in the 
Twitterverse. Searches queried hashtags for the general concepts in question, #roadpricing 
(Figure 7) and #streetsafety (Figure 8), and popular implementation-specific hashtags for each 
concept, #congestioncharge (Figure 9) and #visionzero (Figure 10), on January 25th, 2016. None 
of these searches yielded any interplay between pricing and safety. The two remain distinctly 
separate conversations. The results are displayed below as topic maps which show the queried 
hashtag at the center, surrounded by a web of connected hashtags and usernames. 
 
















Figure 8: Twitter mentions of the hashtag #congestion charge. Source: Mentionmapp (2016). 
 
 





Figure 9: Twitter mentions of the hashtag #safestreets. Source: Mentionmapp (2016). 
 
 











In a cursory review of London’s media articles, there is little discussion of the safety impacts of 
the LCC. A couple of exceptions are noted below. The measure of Google searches for the 




“congestion charge” and the research literature topic of “road traffic safety” are included for 
comparison to Stockholm and New York City (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Google searches for the terms “congestion charge” (blue) and “road traffic safety” 
(red) in the United Kingdom from January 2004 until March 2016. Image from Google Trends.  
 
 
In 2003 an Institute of Fiscal Studies report (Blow, Leicester, Smith) discussed the impacts of 
London’s congestion charging system, which at the time was brand new. It refers to TfL's 
inclusion of expected accident reduction in its social cost-benefit analysis of the scheme.  
 
It also looks at allocation of £130 million of revenue for 2003-2004, which applied £42 million 
to "safer streets" initiatives including safer routes to school, and a Road Safety Plan. The 
remainder of the revenue was allocated toward public transportation. 
 
In 2015, articles began to discuss a pricing-safety connection in depth, largely in response to the 
Lancaster University (Green et. al.) study. An article in Wired Magazine, “London’s Congestion 
Pricing Plan is Saving Lives,” discusses the Lancaster University study's findings, emphasizing 
the estimated 40% reduction in vehicle collisions since the charging system was put in place. It 
explains how the authors of the study used collisions and traffic flow data, correlated with the 
congestion zone using GIS and statistical software, to compare collision rates in London to 20 
other UK cities between 2000 and 2010. The article reports how Green pointed out that there's a 
big drop in traffic flow, but an even bigger drop in crashes. "There's just less cars to hit each 




other," he rationalizes, as quoted in the article.  The article also discusses external effects beyond 
the charging zone and beyond the charging hours, with Green attributing this to a widespread 
change in driver behavior. 
Stockholm 
This paper’s review of public discourse in Stockholm is mostly excluded, for a couple of 
reasons. First, the minimal number of articles available in English presented a practical hurdle. 
And second, the success of meeting with and interviewing Stockholm policymakers and 
advocates made it practical to focus more on the professional discourse in Stockholm. The 
measure of Google searches for the Stockholm congestion charge (“Trängselskatt i Stockholm” 
in Swedish) and the research literature topic of “road traffic safety” are included below for 
comparison to London and New York City (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Google searches for the terms “Trängselskatt i Stockholm” (the Swedish term for the 
Stockholm congestion charge, in blue) and “road traffic safety” (red) in Sweden from January 
2004 until March 2016. Image from Google Trends.  
 
New York City 
This public discourse review addresses the question: what role does street safety play in the 
discourse of congestion pricing among advocates, media, and other public information in New 
York City? It looks at a wide variety of sources and formats, including articles, reports, and other 




documents published between 2000 and 2015. It will proceed chronologically to allow for the 
identification of temporal trends (see Figure 13) and influences of political or economic events 
on the literature.  




In 1991, a U.S. Senate hearing (Senate Hearing 1991) before a subcommittee on water resources, 
transportation, and infrastructure featured discussion about road pricing, hosted by New York 
Senator Daniel Moynihan. Moynihan expressed the opinion that urban planners had failed in 
their attempts to build interstate highways through American urban centers because of the 
consequences for those areas – and that pricing was beginning to be recommended to him as a 
mechanism to control traffic.  
 




Senator Dave Durenberger of Minnesota recognized the multifaceted benefits of congestion 
pricing, notably the opportunity to obtain revenue that could augment public funds to finance 
transportation infrastructure, the opportunity to reduce air quality problems and vehicle gridlock. 
Senator Steve Symms of Idaho made a nod to safety, though not safety on streets themselves, by 
noting that congestion pricing could be a way to not only reduce traffic jams, but improve access 
for public safety and emergency vehicles. 
 
Dr. Steven Morrison, Professor in the Department of Economics at Northeastern University, 
testified as to the wastefulness of congestion (since drivers impose costs on each other and there 
is no gain), and the futility of road widening (he explained what is now understood as induced 
demand) in an argument for the ability of pricing to effectively regulate traffic on highways by 
altering driver behaviors, while also raising funding to maintain those very highways. 
 
Ten years after that Senate hearing, as a Republican New York City mayoral candidate, Michael 
Bloomberg published a policy paper that included congestion pricing as a policy to encourage 
off-hours truck delivery into Manhattan, as one of many strategies for addressing congestion and 
its externalities. In the paper, safety is the first externality mentioned and a primary focus of his 
policy prescriptions, so we may reasonably assume that Bloomberg was considering congestion 
pricing as one element of a holistic approach to reducing traffic congestion and making streets 
safer.  
 
With very little public discussion of congestion pricing from that moment through 2005, we 
return to the literature in 2006, when Aaron Naparstek (2006c) at the transportation news blog 
Streetsblog reports on then-New York City DOT Commissioner Iris Weinshall’s visit to 
Stockholm, where she attended a conference of which the primary topic was congestion pricing. 
Transportation professionals from Stockholm, London, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen made 
presentations and emphasized their efforts to reduce street user conflicts that result in crashes. 
The article then goes on to note that “an unexpected side benefit” of congestion charging in 
London was between 40 and 70 fewer vehicle crashes per year in Central London. It discusses 




the nexus between congestion, “conflict” between vehicles, pedestrians, and other street users, 
and the resultant danger of navigating New York City’s streets. It does not recommend 
congestion pricing directly as a solution, though the suggestion is implicit in the article. This is 
the first instance of safety explicitly entering the literature. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Carolyn Curiel (2006) at the New York Times writes about the costs of 
congestion in New York, exclaiming that the worst effect of that congestion is that “traffic 
congestion costs lives.” Among a handful of policy recommendations to address this congestion, 
she mentions congestion pricing. As with other articles from this time, most of the focus is on 
reducing congestion, and thus reducing its attendant externalities. Pricing is seen as one 
innovative way to do so, and although it was available as a concept (as noted in the article 
detailing Commissioner Weinshall’s experience in Stockholm) little specific data about the 
actual relationship between pricing and safety enters the conversation. 
 
Around the same time, a long-awaited study is published by The Partnership for New York City 
(2006), an organization of business CEOs in New York City. Notably, the report, “Growth or 
Gridlock: The Economic Case for Traffic and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York,” 
which numerous articles later mention as the spark for congestion pricing discussions in New 
York City, does not recognize safety. The report breaks down the potential benefits of pricing, 
naming congestion relief, trip speed and reliability, bus speeds, and pollution reduction but 
leaving out any mention of street safety. Nor is safety mentioned in a 2007 New York Times op-
ed by Ken Livingstone, mayor of London during that city’s implementation of congestion 
charging and simultaneous broad reduction of vehicle crashes and casualties.  
The 2008 Bloomberg Proposal 
By early 2008, the Bloomberg congestion pricing proposal for New York City is on the table, 
and news articles and opinion pieces are being produced at a rapid rate. At the time, everyone 
has an opinion about congestion pricing. The public’s activity on search engines is evidence of 
spiking curiosity (see Figure 14). (Mentions of “congestion pricing” and the research literature 




category “road traffic safety” were tracked in worldwide Google searches starting in January of 
2004 using Google Trends. While this tool does not allow for an analysis of any nexus between 
these search terms (i.e., the ability to see whether they are searched together or simultaneously) it 
does track the popularity of both topics over time.) Searches for “congestion pricing” spike in 
April of 2008, around the time that New York City’s congestion pricing proposal for lower 
Manhattan was getting the most attention. Notably, there is no obvious correlation between 
interest in congestion pricing and interest in street safety. 
 
Figure 14: Google searches for the terms “congestion pricing” (blue) and “road traffic safety” 




The New York Times takes an especially strong stance, publishing numerous staff editorials 
advocating for the proposal’s approval. But while the political maneuvering of city and state 
officials takes over the congestion pricing headlines, few even mention safety. A couple of 
exceptions include Charles Komanoff’s 2008 article “Congestion Pricing vs. Ravitch Plan” and 
his 2009 article “Beyond Ravitch,” which begin to hint at safety implications of pricing. He 
mentions in each, respectively, that pricing could be an answer to congestion that is “community-
wrecking” and "dehumanizes our city." 
 
And a 2009 article by Ben Fried at Streetsblog, “Stringer, Squadron and Silver Call for Safer 
Chinatown Streets,” discusses a plan released by Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer 




and State Senator Daniel Squadron, in response to a vehicle crash that killed two children on a 
Chinatown sidewalk, that calls for congestion pricing as one of several traffic management 
techniques. Although pricing and safety are not explicitly linked, we can see an implicit 
connection beginning to form, with the assumption that congestion pricing would somehow 
improve safety on city streets. 
Post-Bloomberg Proposal 
After the political intrigue of the Bloomberg proposal and a few subsequent attempts to revive it 
dies down, the literature slowly begins to address the true potential impacts of congestion 
pricing, and safety reenters the conversation. Jacob Dunbar’s 2010 article mentions that "the 
congestion charge…has reduced the number of car crashes" in London, but does not further 
discuss safety as an important effect. Komanoff (2013) in a 2013 Streetsblog article, references 
TfL’s “Travel in London, Report 5” as he argues that London streets have become safer. He 
notes that travel fatalities and serious injuries had fallen to the lowest on record in London, with 
cycling casualties having risen. In this case, safety is a present but very much a secondary 
concern. 
 
While street safety was beginning to get a foothold in the conversation about pricing, other 
environmental and “public health” impacts were already fairly well established. Air pollution, for 
example, is often cited as a result of vehicle traffic in the city, with detrimental health effects. Up 
until 2012, air pollution receives far more attention than safety as a positive public health 
externality of pricing. Brad Aaron, in a 2009 article, reports on research from the New York City 
Department of Health detailing the poisonous levels of particulate matter due to high traffic 
volumes in some neighborhoods. Aaron states that pricing would reduce vehicle traffic and 
pollution. Ditto for Komanoff’s 2009 article “Paradox, Schmaradox. Congestion Pricing Works” 
and Diane Cardwell’s 2008 “Paterson Supports Congestion Pricing.” Street safety as a public 
health effect is simply not mentioned. 
 




PlaNYC 2030, Mayor Bloomberg’s sustainability plan, in its 2011 update, is similarly focused 
on environmental concerns. It discusses the need for street safety improvements for pedestrians 
and cyclists. It also mentions road pricing as an option for managing congestion - but makes no 
connections between the two concepts. 
The Move NY Fair Plan 
In early 2015, The NY Fair Plan, the Sam Schwartz-led proposal for more balanced tolls and a 
handful of related measures that more or less amount to a congestion pricing system, makes a 
comprehensive and very well-informed argument for pricing, with numerous specific 
recommendations for implementation. And while safety is incorporated into this argument, its 
significance in the proposal is minimal, with just two sentences in a 37-page proposal dedicated 
to the topic of safety. The proposal names reduced vehicle traffic and the elimination of toll 
shopping as the factors that would reduce collisions. The toll shopping argument is based on the 
fact that drivers, many of them truck drivers, go out of their way to take free East River crossings 
(for example the Brooklyn, Manhattan, Williamsburg, or Queensboro bridges) instead of 
continuing on a more direct route on a tolled crossing (for example, the Queens-Midtown or 
Brooklyn Battery tunnels). These alternate routing decisions, in search of free crossings, take 
drivers through residential neighborhoods and, MoveNY argues, makes those neighborhoods 
more dangerous. The proposal assumes that balancing East River crossing tolls would eliminate 
“toll shopping,” removing the incentive to drive unnecessarily through residential 
neighborhoods. 
 
While newspaper articles report support from Mayor Bill de Blasio, and City Council Member 
and Chair of the Council’s Transportation Committee Ydanis Rodriguez, the NY Fair Plan does 
not appear to have gotten very far. Political opposition from the state level, and in particular 
Governor Andrew Cuomo, is often cited as the primary roadblock. A New York Daily News 
article from July 23, 2015 conveys the atmosphere at the time: “Cuomo quickly threw cold water 
on the idea. ‘Been there, done that,’ he said” (Fermino and Durkin 2015). 
 




Politicians’ support for pricing in New York, as in 2008, focused primarily on the revenue-
producing and perceived equity potential of pricing. In March of 2015, Bronx City Council 
Member James Vacca declares his support for the NY Fair Plan as a means to “address the city’s 
gridlock and the high price of tolls and MTA fares that significantly affect outerborough 
residents” (Jorgensen 2015). In an April 2015 letter to New York State lawmakers, a handful of 
other Democratic City Council members and State legislators voice their support. “To fund this 
expansion of Full-Line Reviews and associated improvements” for transit service, the letter 
states, “and ensure the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) can fund a sufficient 
capital plan, we support the Move NY Fair Plan” (Barkan 2015).  
 
But the NY Fair Plan also revived dormant conversation about congestion pricing, and its 
potential impacts for safety on city streets. Addressing the politics of pricing in response to the 
new attention being given to Move NY, Fried (2015), in a July 2015 article on Streetsblog, 
discusses the political implications of congestion, stating that it makes street safety redesigns 
more difficult, making the City more hesitant to implement, for example, Vision Zero projects. 
And he argues that the discourse around congestion and potential pricing mechanisms must focus 
on the benefits to New Yorkers of newly opened street space. 
 
Meanwhile, Charles Komanoff’s proprietary Balanced Transportation Analyzer (last updated 
December 2015), is used as a primary analysis tool for the New York Fair Plan. The Analyzer is 
an ever-evolving data analysis tool for measuring impacts of changes to a transportation system, 
one that he refers to often in his discussions about congestion pricing. It dedicates one of its 46 
sections to traffic crashes, predicting an approximately 3% reduction in crashes, fatalities, and 
injuries across all modes if the Fair Plan were to be implemented.  
 
And Komanoff, in an August 2015 article, argues that a recent cyclist death in Queens may have 
been caused by "toll shopping" and that the Fair Plan could be "a vital ingredient" for Vision 
Zero. He cites lower VMT, fewer vehicles, and resulting less driver frustration and less 
menacing behavior as reasons the Fair Plan could make streets safer. Additionally, reducing toll 




shopping could take vehicles off of small neighborhood streets and put them back on bigger 
arterials and highways which are better designed to handle the volume and urgency of a morning 
or evening rush. 
The Lancaster University Study 
In March of 2015, a new working paper about the safety effects of congestion charging in 
London is published by Colin Green and economists at Lancaster University in the U.K. A flurry 
of New York media responses, both original and referencing U.K. media, emerged to cover the 
paper and its presentation at the Royal Economic Society. 
 
In Komanoff (2015)’s article Just in from London, he brings safety to the forefront, pointing to 
the Lancaster paper as evidence that street safety is a benefit of congestion pricing. Komanoff 
states that crash rates are “significantly lower with congestion charging,” with the difference 
amounting to as much as 40% within the charging zone. Komanoff also notes crash rate 
reduction externalities, with a 14% reduction in “spillover zones” just outside the zone,  
reductions in crashes for uncharged vehicles like taxis, motorcycles, and bicycles, and reductions 
during non-charging hours. He refers briefly to the study’s quantitative analysis, which used a 
control group of 20 other British urban areas to control for wider trends in road safety (see 
Figure 15). 




Figure 15: Traffic crashes in London before and after implementation of the London Congestion 
Charge, in comparison to control cities. Image source: Charles Komanoff (2015).
 
 
Komanoff concludes that there have been “robust and multi-dimensional” reductions in crash 
rates over the course of the LCC. He claims that the case dispels the idea that higher traffic 
speeds (as expected from a congestion pricing system) make streets more dangerous, as increases 
in average driving speeds correspond “more to smoothing traffic than accelerating it.” Komanoff 
also suggests the concept that there has been an experiential change on London’s streets, with the 




“character of urban driving” having become more relaxed as increased predictability of trips 
creates less tension and impatience for drivers. 
 
Doward (2015) reports on the same Lancaster University study with a less biased tone, calling it 
newsworthy as the first study of its kind. Like Komanoff, Doward alludes to the fact that the 
study’s findings are contrary to the commonly held belief that faster traffic speeds would result 
in higher risk of crashes. He emphasizes the finding that crash reduction occurred outside the 
charging zone as well as within it, attributing this to fewer people driving through immediately 
adjacent communities to reach the inner city. The article resonated in New York, with former 
City Transportation Commissioner Janette Sadik-Khan (2015) stating that “pound for pound, (the 
LCC is) one of the great road safety success stories.” Doward also specifically notes the trends 
present for cyclists, for whom crash rates increased immediately after implementation of the 
charge. But those rates have fallen consistently since 2006, and Colin Green, one of the authors 
of the Lancaster University Study, suggests that these early increases were a result of more 
inexperienced cycling in the city as people adapted to the charge. 
 
A media briefing by the Royal Economic Society, where the Lancaster paper was officially 
presented, hailed it as “the first evidence” of the LCC’s effect on crashes, crash rates, and 
casualties. It emphasizes that not only are total crashes down (along with VMT), but so are crash 
rates, indicating that there is a greater effect to safety than just reduction of  vehicle miles or 
congestion. It suggests that pricing may make city streets safer. This briefing also echoes the 
findings about spillover zones and cyclists, and notes that initial fears of cyclist danger 
increasing have been dispelled.  
 




Table 2: New York City public discourse about congestion pricing, 2000-2015. Items highlighted 
indicate articles that discuss safety as a potential impact of congestion pricing.
 




Table 2 (continued): New York City public discourse about congestion pricing, 2000-2015. 
Items highlighted indicate articles that discuss safety as a potential impact of congestion pricing.
 




Table 2 (continued): New York City public discourse about congestion pricing, 2000-2015. 
Items highlighted indicate articles that discuss safety as a potential impact of congestion pricing.
 




Table 2 (continued): New York City public discourse about congestion pricing, 2000-2015. 
Items highlighted indicate articles that discuss safety as a potential impact of congestion pricing. 
 
Professional Discourse 
Transport for London Congestion Charge Reports 
Each year from 2003 to 2008, TfL released a report on their monitoring of the LCC. The 2003 
report primarily laid out the structure for this monitoring, and gave anticipated results, (there was 
not yet data to monitor). Each report has been analyzed for its discussion of safety as an impact 
of the congestion charge (Table 3), and that discourse is discussed below in chronological order. 
 
The four primary purposes of the LCC, per TfL’s annual reports on the system, are generally to 
reduce congestion, to improve bus service, to improve trip reliability, and to make distribution of 
goods and services more efficient. As a secondary purpose, TfL also notes that the LCC 
“generates revenues to support the Mayor’s Transport Strategy” (TfL 2004). Notably, on TfL’s 
online information about the LCC, there is no mention of safety as an impact nor as an intention 
of the charge. 




Table 3: Discussion of Safety in Transport for London Congestion Charge Impacts Reports, 
2003-2008, and Ex-post Evaluation of Quantified Impacts, 2007. Data: Transport for London.
 





In 2003, the first of year of LCC reporting, TfL does not explicitly address safety. While in later 
reports safety will be a primary element of “environmental impacts” along with air quality, noise, 
and perceived environmental quality effects, in this first report safety is not included. The lone 
reference to safety comes from the report’s social impacts surveys, in which the report states that 
respondents in one neighborhood, Bowes Park, “anticipated an improvement to the sense of 
community and safety,” citing the perception of one resident who said they believed congestion 
charging would lead to “‘clearer roads and a feeling of space’” (Transport for London 2003). 
 
Safety appears to first deliberately enter official TfL documents in 2004, when the LCC report 
notes that sufficient data for early analysis is finally possible, using eight months of data up to 
October 2003 (and adding that a full analysis of a year’s data would not be possible until 
Autumn 2004). The report identifies a “recent pattern of decreasing levels of (crashes) within the 
charging zone.” The report attempts to dispel three theories about the LCC’s impact on safety. 
First, it responds to concerns about negative spillover effects, stating that “there is no evidence of 
detrimental change in road traffic accidents within or around the zone.” Second, it responds to 
concerns about increasing bicycle and motorcycle crashes, stating that “there is no evidence of 
disproportionate changes to the numbers of accidents involving two-wheeled vehicles as some 
had feared.” Third, it responds to concerns about speed increases within the CCZ, stating that 
there was no evidence for “an increase in fatalities or serious injuries due to increased average 
network traffic speeds” (Transport for London 2003). 
 
The report also alludes to a potential decline in the rate of crashes, noting that “there is some 
evidence of an accelerated decline” in crashes inside the CCZ. 
 
The 2004 LCC report also reports on measurements of residents’ perceived safety, in their local 
area and in their journeys, before and after implementation of the charge, as an element of social 
and behavioral impacts of the system. Responses indicate that within the CCZ, people’s 
perceptions of safety increased, while outside the CCZ, perceptions of safety decreased.  





Specifically, 17% of residents within the CCZ perceived their area to be safer, and 16% 
perceived their journeys to be safer, compared to 9% and 10%, respectively, who perceived their 
area or journey to be less safe. Outside the CCZ (in Inner London), 19% of people perceived 
their area to be less safe, and 18% perceived their journey to be less safe, compared to 6% and 
12%, respectively, who felt it was safer. The trend continues with residents in Outer London, and 
beyond the M25 Motorway ring also perceiving a decline in safety (Transport for London 2004). 
2005-2006 
In 2005, the LCC report identifies the reduction in road crashes as “an additional social benefit,” 
with between 40 and 70 fewer accidents per year since the charge had been implemented 
(Figures 16 and 17). It uses data from outside the charging zone as a control, to demonstrate that 
changes in collision numbers are not purely the result of “background” change such as 
“extensive media campaigns and traffic calming measures.” In an effort to dispel earlier fears, it 
is deliberate in declaring that the charge has no disproportionate safety impact on bicycles or 
motorcycles (Transport for London 2005).  
2007-2008 
The 2007 report states that injuries were down for both slight and serious categories, refuting the 
notion that less congestion will lead to more serious injuries. Collisions were inconsistent for 
taxis, up for cyclists, and down for all other vehicle types (Transport for London 2007). 
 
By 2008 the data had moved out of the environmental impacts section into a section titled 
“public transport, road traffic collisions and air quality.” In 2008 the report states that the 
charging scheme had contributed to an estimated reduction of 40 to 70 collisions involving 
personal injury within the LCC and on the Inner Ring Road, above what would have been 
expected from “wider background trends.” The report observes a continuation of the trend in 
reduction of crashes, though it notes some anomalies in 2005 and 2006 data that led to increased 
crashes in some categories. 





The 2008 report discusses two primary obstacles in reporting on safety benefits. The first is the 
lag in data provision, a reflection of the slow process of police investigations, which in turn 
creates a lag in reporting on crash trends. The other obstacle is what the report terms “technical 
difficulties” that prevented a substantial analysis of crashes in the Western Extension (Transport 
for London 2008). 
 
Figure 16: Road traffic accident casualties in the charging zone (monthly totals by time period). 
Image source: Transport for London (2005).
 
 




Figure 17: Road traffic accident casualties on the Inner Ring Road (monthly totals by time 
period). Image source: Transport for London (2005).
 
Interviews 
Is Safety Discussed in the Congestion Pricing Discourse? How is it Discussed? 
Respondents largely indicated that there has been no active discussion on the topic of safety 
benefits of congestion pricing, though it is “worth investigating,” said one London respondent, 
since “this is one of the most significant and contentious public policies in the UK in the last 
twenty years.” Although safety was discussed in the early stages of LCC planning, it was in the 
context of an expected increase in bicycle and motorcycle crashes.  
 
According to Stockholm policy makers, safety was not a big issue in the discourse about 
introducing pricing prior to the 2005 trial, and transportation agencies in Sweden do not really 
consider safety at all in the context of congestion pricing, nor do they consider the two 
phenomena to be substantially linked.  
 




New York interview respondents also indicated that there has been “very little” to “no” 
conversation of safety in their discourse about congestion pricing. This was true across different 
disciplines (with the only exception coming from safety advocates who were deliberately 
addressing congestion pricing as a way to reduce vehicle volumes). Rather, respondents 
explained that the agenda for congestion pricing has primarily revolved around two issues: 
reducing congestion (and, by extension, reducing costs of business and promoting economic 
activity), and creating a source of revenue for transit and roadway infrastructure that was 
reaching capacity. Air quality concerns were a third element of the agenda, according to one 
policy maker, who pointed to the reduced air pollution and emissions likely to result from a 
congestion pricing system. 
What Are Understood to Be the Primary Benefits of Congestion Pricing? 
Most respondents in Stockholm agreed that congestion relief, particularly at peak hours, was the 
primary benefit of congestion pricing; environmental impacts, especially emissions reduction, 
and revenue, particularly for transit improvements, were secondary benefits. These were also 
seen as the top agenda items for the national government in implementing the Stockholm 
congestion charge. But policy makers, planners and advocates, and academics had different ways 
of understanding the benefits of the charge. 
 
London respondents were in agreement that the greatest benefits of the congestion charge in 
London, and the agenda used to promote it, were considered to be reduced congestion for cars 
and buses, and secondarily revenue that was raised from the charge. One respondent noted that 
space taken back for pedestrians and cyclists, and pollution reduction could be seen as “a bonus” 
on top of congestion and revenue benefits. The respondent cautioned, however, that since the 
Western Extension did not make an impact on congestion levels, one should not assume that the 
impacts of a congestion charge are “automatic.” Another London respondent said that while 
safety was initially considered as a potential negative impact, this was dispelled after research 
and modeling. 
 




Policy makers tended to focus on congestion reduction and environmental impact reduction. In 
reducing congestion, policy makers spoke of the congestion charge quite in practical terms, 
emphasizing the “evening out” of traffic volumes throughout the day and night and rerouting 
trips geographically, so as to minimize congestion at peak hours. In reducing environmental 
impacts, the primary benefits that policy makers expected and observed from the congestion 
charge in Stockholm were reduced vehicle emissions and noise, and an improvement in people’s 
perception of their city environment. Respondents were familiar with the environmental 
arguments that were made in the political realm for the charge prior to its implementation, 
recalling that not only was the Green Party a driving force behind the successful adoption of a 
congestion charging trial, but the concept was initially called “environmental fees.”  
 
Two policy makers also acknowledged that revenue was a substantial benefit of the Stockholm 
congestion charge, though in their minds it was tertiary. Respondents stated that much of the 
revenue from the congestion charge was directed toward transit improvements, particularly the 
building of a new subway line, and the construction of a new bypass road. While several 
respondents stated the assumption that investment in transit was an indirect investment in safety 
(assuming that when more residents ride transit, there are fewer cars, and streets are thus safer), 
they also acknowledged that the revenues could provide an opportunity to invest in street safety 
improvements directly - though this had yet to be done in Stockholm. 
 
Planners and advocates brought a broader perspective to the benefits and agenda of congestion 
pricing implementation. They agreed that congestion and environmental goals were the primary 
agenda items for implementing congestion pricing, and safety was not. One planner pointed out 
that one element of the disconnect between the safety discourse and the congestion pricing 
discourse is the prioritization of two fundamentally different goals: the traffic safety discourse 
tends to talk about speed, not volume, while congestion pricing is generally understood to target 
volume. In addressing the environmental objective, an advocate explained that the campaign for 
the Stockholm Congestion Charge by environmentally-minded politicians and advocates was 




part of a mission to prevent highway building in the Stockholm area, by reducing congestion and 
thus the perceived need for new highways. 
 
Academics, too, understood that the intentions and the benefits of congestion pricing were 
primarily congestion relief and reduction of environmental impacts. One respondent explained 
that in the discourse of congestion charging, traffic planners often feel the need to emphasize 
congestion reduction in their proposals, because they believe that other traffic planners want 
more roads (even though in actuality most planners understand that limiting demand is a better 
way to improve street conditions) and must be convinced otherwise. Academics acknowledged 
that congestion pricing is a tool that can be used for various purposes, including environmental, 
livability, and safety purposes. One respondent noted that over time, the purpose of pricing has 
increasingly moved toward attracting funding for new infrastructure, and indeed the more recent 
congestion pricing scheme in the Swedish city of Goteborg has primary been about revenue. 
Different Understandings of the Data 
While some Stockholm policy makers were aware of the 2006 Stockholm Congestion Charge 
Trial evaluation and its discussion of safety, a couple were of the understanding that no 
statistically significant connection was discovered between the congestion charge and safety 
outcomes. Another policy maker clarified that while safety impacts of the congestion charging 
trial were considered to be “substantive,” with estimates of 40-70 fewer death- or injury-causing 
crashes per year, the changes were not statistically significant. In a 2013 report anticipating a 
possible expansion of the charging zone, the respondent added, safety is mentioned, but only 
nominally, in reference to an assumption of traffic safety improvements.  
 
One London respondent similarly stated that they were not aware of any prior data illuminating a 
connection between congestion pricing and safety, and that while safety benefits would not come 
as a surprise to economists or others with some depth of knowledge about pricing, it certainly 
was not already common knowledge.  
 




Another London respondent felt that the decrease in crash and casualty rates in London was an 
important sign that the LCC had significant safety benefits. The respondent explained that “raw 
numbers (e.g., a decrease in the number of crashes in London) only tell you that people are 
responding to some incentive or intervention” whereas a decrease in the rate allows for 
identification of a problem. That respondent also noted the challenges of the “missing 
counterfactual” in determining the true safety impacts of congestion pricing. That is to say, it is 
hard to know what would have happened had the charge never been implemented in London, 
considering that crashes have been trending downward in the UK at large, and there have been a 
lot of road safety initiatives and safety improvements to vehicles that have undeniably 
contributed to those local and national decreases. 
 
A London-based planner noted another contradiction of data: London’s brief Western Extension 
to the CCZ showed signs of increased vehicle crash rates, contradicting the findings from the 
original CCZ. While the exact reasons for this contrast were not clearly evident, the respondent 
added, it is likely due to differences in the characteristics of the Western Extension area, which is 
primarily residential and has more through-traffic than the CCZ. 
Non-linearity 
Two Stockholm respondents were somewhat at odds over the concept of a non-linear 
relationship between congestion reduction and safety. One, a policy maker, stated that the 
relationship is less than linear, such that a doubling of traffic would lead to only a 40% increase 
in fatalities. A Stockholm planner, meanwhile, speculated that the effect of the congestion charge 
on safety is roughly linear, while the effect on congestion is more than linear, so that causes 
people to focus more on congestion. One academic felt that the jury was still out on the rate of 
crashes, fatalities, and injuries since implementation of Stockholm’s cordon, and commented that 
the time was probably nearing when the data time series would be long enough to make more 
conclusive findings. 





If there was understood to be any connection between congestion pricing and safety in London, 
one respondent said, then (at least early in the implementation of the LCC) it may have been in 
the context that bike fatalities and serious injuries increased, a trend that was seized upon by 
opponents of the charge. The respondent noted, in counterpoint, that while initial bicycle injuries 
and fatalities did increase, they increased only in quantity, and not in rate per bicyclist. One 
Stockholm planner noted that while safety generally does not enter the conversation about 
congestion pricing, when the Stockholm charge was introduced there was speculation that the 
charge could lessen traffic and allow some streets to be converted to more pedestrianized, livable 
streets. The respondent emphasized that that speculation centered around livability, though, 
much more than it did around safety as an end in itself. 
 
Among advocates and planners in Stockholm, safety did come up in conversation “at the 
margins, in that everyone seemed to assume that safety would be improved,” likewise, one street 
safety advocate and consultant explained that congestion pricing was not a part of their 
considerations about fostering street safety, a trend they said was reflected in discourse with 
peers and colleagues, as well.  
Personal Opinions 
One academic commented that there has been a “striking silence” as to the link between pricing 
and safety. It hasn’t been a part of the discourse nor measured very well, they said, and they were 
not aware of any studies to that effect since the permanent congestion charge was implemented. 
This lack of conversation, the respondent said, could reflect the fact that safety has been 
marginalized as a topic in Sweden, with crash response focused primarily on explaining crashes 
by assigning blame or trying to find a cause in the street design, and safety researchers 
increasingly focused on arranging technical solutions like cameras etc.  
 
This surprise at the lack of attention to safety benefits was reflected in the perspective of another 
Stockholm respondent, a planner, who explained that the lack of attention to congestion pricing’s 




safety benefits may be a result of too little data - they explained how hard it is to decipher the 
policy’s impact on fatalities and serious injuries in a city with notoriously few traffic fatalities 
and injuries to begin with. 
 
New York respondents echoed that congestion relief is the most valuable and effective benefit of 
congestion pricing, with one planner opining that “there is no better tool” for reducing 
congestion, and at the end of the day the only way to really convince people to stop driving is to 
make them pay. “It’s a basic economic concept,” the respondent stated. One academic agreed, 
stating that “the objective of congestion pricing should be to reduce congestion.” Respondents 
acknowledged that pricing can accomplish other aims, but “probably not as much as you want it 
to” - and the degree to which benefits other than congestion relief are realized depends on the 
design of the congestion pricing policy. 
Reclaiming Space 
Responses to the potential for reclaimed space varied, but generally supported the concept that 
congestion pricing could make reallocation of space structurally and politically easier by 
reducing vehicle volumes (and thus decreasing demand for vehicle space on streets).  
 
One London respondent indicated that the reallocation of street space to pedestrians, cyclists, and 
city buses had in fact contributed significantly to the value of the congestion charge. “We used 
the freed capacity from having fewer vehicles to adjust the balance of traffic,” another stated, 
using the congestion charge as an opportunity to implement bus and cycle priority measures, 
more green light time for pedestrians and less green light time for cars. Without the congestion 
charge, the respondent added, “that would not have happened.” 
 
Another respondent offered a different answer, saying that the policy must be evaluated “as a 
whole, and the impacts depend closely on what happens with the revenue,” so reclaiming space 
could be a part of the solution that leads to safer streets, but ultimately it depends on how the 
pricing scheme and any attendant street improvements are implemented. Another London 




respondent echoed this concept, agreeing that the LCC has presented the opportunity to 
implement new bus, pedestrian, and bicycle infrastructure but that this would only present 
definite safety benefits if the new infrastructure were properly designed for safety. Perhaps most 
importantly, they suggested, it gives planners a chance “to rebuild and rethink how to make 
streets safer.” 
 
Stockholm and Swedish policy makers stated that the Stockholm congestion charge has 
unintentionally facilitated the city’s reallocation of some street space to bike and pedestrian 
facilities. Respondents emphasized that this reallocation has been part of a separate pedestrian- 
and bicycle-friendliness agenda for the city - but the congestion charge, by lowering overall 
traffic volumes, has made it easier to take away street space from vehicles. Moreover, a 
significant portion of revenues from the charge have been directed toward transit, which was 
seen as an important policy in terms of creating more livable and safer streets. 
 
Planners and advocates in Stockholm agreed that that charging, and reduction of vehicle 
volumes, makes taking space away from drivers easier. But one respondent pointed out that in 
Stockholm that reallocated space has largely been given to buses, not bicycles and pedestrians. 
The respondent was optimistic that the congestion charge was still indirectly enabling safer 
facilities for pedestrians and cyclists, however, and wondered whether Stockholm’s new bicycle 
infrastructure plans would have been possible without implementation of the congestion charge.  
 
Academics in Stockholm acknowledged that if traffic volumes are reduced, it has the potential to 
enable reallocation of street space to walking, bicycling, and transit modes (which, they noted, 
are generally safer than personal driving). One respondent said that a primary limitation to this 
argument, however, is that the Stockholm cordon system has made it such that if a driver stays 
within the city, there is no extra cost. The main congestion reduction has thus been around the 
cordon, with minimal reduction in the inner city, so opportunities to reclaim street capacity may 
not be widespread within the inner city neighborhoods.  
 




Stockholm’s academic interview respondents also challenged the idea that transit has benefited 
as significantly from the congestion charge as policy makers imply, arguing that Stockholm 
county policies have not put the congestion charge to its full use in terms of transit impacts. Just 
before the trial, one respondent explained, the city and the county of Stockholm increased bus 
services as part of the trial. But that did not happen when it became a permanent system. Another 
respondent added another limitation, noting that the ability of Stockholm policy makers to 
reallocate street space toward bus capacity has been somewhat limited by the fact that congestion 
charging impacts in Stockholm are focused on arterials, where bus service capacity is already 
high (meaning there are already dedicated lanes, and thus no need or ability to add additional 
infrastructure). Now, respondents said, the congestion tax is primarily used to fund a highway, 
with funding coming soon to fund a subway line.  
 
The concept of reallocating street space away from vehicles (and reallocating it, for example, to 
city bus, bicycle, or pedestrian infrastructure) was a relatively popular one with interview 
respondents in New York as well, though some cautioned that congestion pricing would not 
necessarily make such reallocation any easier than usual.  
 
One New York policy maker cautiously agreed that reducing aggregate demand could 
conceivably allow the Department of Transportation to reallocate street space to other uses. 
Others were more optimistic: they stated that the opportunity to reallocate street space was not 
only realistic but that the ability of congestion pricing to make streets safer truly depended in 
large part on whether street safety design improvements were made for that reallocated space. 
One academic stressed that while the idea of reallocating space was valid, it would only be 
beneficial to safety if street design changes caused a slowing of traffic.  
 
Practically speaking, if the space were to be reallocated to city buses (for example, by setting 
aside new dedicated right-of-ways for buses), noted one planner, reallocation would need to be 
targeted in places in which the new congestion levels are in the “sweet spot” for dedicated bus 
service - that is, not so congested that bus service would still be compromised by gridlock, and 




not so uncongested that dedicated bus lanes would be unwarranted. A couple of respondents 
cautioned, however, that lower traffic volume is a helpful but often insufficient prerequisite to 
reclaiming street space - it still is difficult to do so, they argued. 
 
There was one last way in which space was reallocated under congestion charging, according to 
one London planner. In anticipation of potential negative spillover safety effects just outside the 
CCZ, TfL made an effort to mitigate such effects by implementing projects to resist any 
displaced traffic, especially on “rat runs” or inappropriate neighborhood shortcuts. Primarily, the 
respondent pointed out, these were projects that benefited safety directly – such as 20 MPH 
school zones, safety schemes around hospitals, and closing streets to through-traffic – or 
indirectly – such as on-street resident parking schemes, and width restrictions on streets to limit 
commercial vehicle traffic. 
Congestion, Speed, and Danger  
Policy makers provided a variety of perspectives on the role of congestion pricing in affecting 
speed and danger on city streets. Most respondents acknowledged that there was disagreement 
over whether pricing had increased or decreased safety in London or Stockholm - some people 
were concerned that traffic safety was negatively impacted by congestion charging, with the 
hypothesis that higher traffic speeds made streets more dangerous, while others expressed that 
lower traffic volumes would lead to safety benefits.  
 
If traffic were to speed up, said one New York planner, streets could be less safe, since slower 
speeds are generally safer. A Stockholm respondent, commenting on the connection of average 
speed to street safety, said that the relationship was quite strong, and thus the increased average 
speeds that resulted from the congestion charge may have made streets more dangerous. That 
respondent emphasized that reducing congestion would not lead to safer streets - only reducing 
speeds would, since reducing speeds tips the proportion of crashes toward those that are less 
serious (reflecting, they said, a Swedish perspective on safety, borne of Vision Zero, that aims to 
minimize serious injuries). The respondent theorized that with faster average speeds, drivers 




could speed more confidently, leading to more serious crashes. A New York academic 
respondent supported this notion, noting that the severity of crashes can go up if the speed goes 
up, and conversely that streets are safer when speeds decrease.  
 
Another Stockholm respondent clarified that congestion was not something a city should 
encourage in an effort to make streets safer - rather, a city should manage congestion in a safe 
way. They explained that the purpose of a city is to allow people to meet without getting in each 
others’ way; to allow traffic, but not too much. A New York policy maker similarly pushed back 
on a binary understanding of the relationship between congestion and speed, and safety, making 
sure to clarify that there is a difference between average speed and maximum speeds, adding that 
if a congestion pricing scheme is only increasing average speeds, that may not necessarily mean 
more dangerous speeds. New York advocates likewise agreed with the notion that congestion 
pricing would smooth traffic more than accelerate it. 
 
Some planners and advocates were more clear on the relationship of congestion to safety, 
focusing on the impact of volume reduction. One New York respondent expected that the 
relationship between reduced vehicle volumes and reduced crashes would be roughly linear. “Is 
there a relationship?” asked one Stockholm respondent. “Yes, certainly - (congestion pricing) 
reduces car volumes. And thus it reduces the incidence of collisions.” That respondent 
acknowledged, however, that in the early discussions about the Stockholm Congestion Charge 
there were counter arguments saying that increased speeds could cause more dangerous streets 
(this was one of many arguments of people trying to universally oppose charging, and was a 
consideration in early discussions in London as well). But they expressed the opinion that few 
people truly believed that argument, citing the tendency of congestion pricing to reduce “stop 
and go” congestion but “not eliminating slowness altogether.” The respondent opined that 
changes in vehicle speed had not been an issue in Stockholm. 
 




One London respondent agreed, noting that increased traffic speeds would not have an impact 
because the increase would be so incremental and suggesting that “congestion itself is dangerous 
because (it causes) lots of acceleration, deceleration and awkward traffic situations.” 
 
But two New York policy makers, and some advocates, pointed out that the whole conversation 
may be moot, since traffic in city cores (such as those targeted by cordon-style congestion 
pricing schemes) will move relatively slowly no matter what, so traffic speed improvements may 
not substantially affect injury rates. 
 
Academics in Stockholm agreed that there is a broad spectrum of understandings about the 
relationship of congestion to speed and danger, and sought to understand why. Both respondents 
explained that the safety impacts of congestion largely depends on how we conceive of or define 
congestion. If we conceive of it as gridlock, for example, it may seem safer, whereas if we 
conceive of it as a steady stream of fast-moving vehicles, we certainly would consider it more 
dangerous. One respondent said that there had been little discussion of congestion as a safety 
problem in and of itself - safety was more often discussed in connection with vehicle volumes. 
Another respondent speculated on the impact of congestion on drivers’ behavior and attitudes, 
suggesting that if the traffic system were more congested, it would create a more stressful 
environment, and make people more aggressive. 
Changing the Transportation Paradigm 
Most respondents acknowledged that congestion pricing could have some impact in changing the 
transportation paradigm, primarily by sending a policy message about the priority of modes, and 
by altering behaviors and attitudes. 
Sending a Message 
One Stockholm planner stressed that congestion pricing casts cars as “no longer always the 
highest priority.” The respondent said that in this way, pricing can be an interesting icebreaker in 
the discourse of transportation planning, and in the context of safety, could be looked at as “a 




first step to looking at traffic safety in a new way.” A London planner stressed that the amount of 
space that has been reallocated away from vehicles as a result of the LCC amounts to a “major 
policy shift” that has gotten people’s attention and especially encouraged bicycling in the city. 
 
Academics were optimistic about the potential for congestion pricing to change the fundamental 
transportation paradigm. One respondent stressed the signal that pricing sends, that “there is a 
cost to car use, that it negatively affects others and someone has to pay for it.” They suggested 
that congestion pricing could even be thought of as “a pedagogical instrument that challenges the 
idea that cars are the only way to get around.” Another respondent expounded on the potential 
safety benefits of congestion pricing, theorizing that congestion pricing in Stockholm had 
changed the discourse about, and public understanding of, transportation modes. They suggested 
that the congestion charge had helped to legitimize bicycle use and led to greater public 
acceptability for public safety projects on streets (such as bike and pedestrian facility 
improvements). 
 
Respondents in New York were generally of the opinion that congestion pricing alone could 
never change the transportation paradigm altogether in the city. But some respondents indicated 
that it could certainly play a significant role. One planner pointed to the big public debate over 
congestion pricing in 2008, and how it served as a public education piece, changing how people 
viewed what the streets are for and helping to pave the way for other street improvements. A 
congestion pricing advocate opined that pricing could change the “mythos of the city” - the 
underlying common vision of how people get around, tilting that vision away from driving and 
more toward other modes as people begin to see the higher costs of driving. 
 
But bringing street redesign back into the picture is important, according to planners who were 
interviewed. They noted that people will not slow down or drive more carefully just because 
they’re aware of the conversation - they do so because things have actually changed. Likewise, a 
balance of education and enforcement are crucial to effect behavior change. As one planner 
explained, from a messaging point of view, it’s better to build physical traffic calming than to 




worry about how people think about modes. In terms of policy statements, something like VZ is 
more powerful when it is an intentional statement. 
Changing Driving Attitudes and Behaviors 
One Stockholm policy maker acknowledged that putting a definitive price on driving into the 
city was certain to have changed the way people think about driving. “These kinds of modes of 
economy affect your whole way of being,” the respondent said, “just like how affluent people 
drive less” in times of recession, whereby the usual “spending mood” is curtailed and people 
begin to think about more efficient modes of getting around. 
 
A New York advocate speculated about possible attitudinal or behavioral change on the part of 
drivers, as a result of reduced congestion levels. That change would be more prevalent, the 
respondent said, for drivers as they enter the charging zone, since people may feel that “once 
they’re in they’re in” and behavior may not change thereafter. And the respondent emphasized 
that such attitude change is speculative - it could go either way (people could feel calmer due to 
less congestion, drive faster because there’s more space, or feel entitled to the road because they 
paid the charge).  
 
Other advocates echoed this speculation, citing the frustration and dangerous driving behavior 
that congestion incites in drivers, and the potential for lowered frustration due to better trip 
reliability under a congestion pricing scheme. One London respondent agreed, stating that 
congestion causes driver frustration and, anecdotally, more dangerous driving behavior. 
Pricing as a Safety Initiative 
Reaction to the concept of pricing as a safety initiative was divided, with many respondents 
supporting the idea in theory but citing practical and political hurdles.  





One London respondent indicated that such an initiative would be wasteful in the push for street 
safety - what was really needed was speed reduction and investment in segregated bicycle lanes. 
An academic respondent in New York similarly questioned whether congestion pricing would be 
the best way to improve safety, citing other interventions that could be better targeted to specific 
safety outcomes, such as better emergency services to reduce crash fatalities or drunk driving 
and texting policies to reduce vehicle crashes. Another respondent cautioned that significantly 
reframing an issue such as congestion pricing is difficult and could raise whole new conflicts - 
people may not feel positive about what they might perceive as “paying to protect someone’s 
neighborhood in Manhattan,” the respondent said.  
 
A planner in London suggested that safety would likely not provide as strong of a public and 
political appeal in present-day London as perceived environmental benefits, which they called “a 
stronger political imperative.” 
 
New York respondents, when asked whether congestion pricing could be proposed as a Vision 
Zero safety policy, were largely skeptical of the political barriers as well as the viability of 
congestion pricing as a safety policy. One respondent was of the opinion that proposing 
congestion pricing as a safety policy would be too big of a lift for safety advocates. “Advocates 
and policy makers would not want to hang their safety policy on such a big proposal that would 
require so much political willpower,” they stated. Since, at present, there is disinterest from New 
York City and State administrations in the current MoveNY proposal, the respondent went on, 
and animosity between the governor and mayor is strong, political barriers to such a proposal 
would be quite high, and adding a safety argument to the mix would not be enough to push it 
over the top. A London respondent had similar reservations, arguing that the groups that a safety 
framework for pricing would appeal to are likely not the groups that need persuading in order to 
implement a pricing system. More important, they suggested, is persuading the people “that think 
car travel is essential” that car travel is neither essential nor efficient. 





Respondents generally indicated that the idea of congestion pricing as a safety policy was a 
compelling idea, and New Yorkers in particular noted that this was an idea that could neatly 
package and sell the benefits of congestion pricing in a way that the 2008 Bloomberg congestion 
pricing proposal did not. The 2008 plan “promised all these big, diffuse benefits, which made it 
hard to understand,” said one New York policy maker in reference to the broad and complicated 
goals of that proposal. The perspective from most interview respondents was, however, that 
congestion pricing would not be implemented in the near future in New York City without “brute 
political force,” as one policy maker said, and “a mayor and governor who take ownership and 
push it through.” 
 
A London respondent pointed to the opportunity to implement pricing such that it was 
geographically structured as a safety system (e.g., targeting reduced vehicle volumes in those 
areas most affected by crashes). With safety-targeted implementation, the respondent asserted, 
congestion pricing could be a valuable safety measure.  
 
Multiple London respondents said that in Stockholm and London, safety is a powerful 
motivation for implementing projects because “the safety conversation is front and center,” 
noting that this could be the case in New York as well, where that safety conversation is just 
beginning to become significant. The respondents suggested that if further research were to 
substantiate recent findings such as the work of Young et. al. (2016), then conceptualizing 
congestion pricing as a Vision Zero policy, for example, “absolutely would be legitimate.” They 
recommended a couple of specific policy strategies. One was to sell pricing as part of a package 
of projected benefits that all focus on using pricing as a market mechanism to reduce costs of the 
transportation system – road crashes and their economic and human costs along with congestion 
and environmental costs. Another recommended policy strategy was to lobby for legislation that 
would funnel all revenue into safety projects. Similar legislation associated with the LCC, one 
London planner said, had proven to be a powerful way to sell the scheme, allowing planners to 
emphasize that “by law, the revenue would go into safety projects.” 





One Stockholm policy maker agreed that safety projects be used as a clear destination of revenue 
from the congestion charge, since “traffic safety is a good thing in the public view.” The 
respondent cited the example of speed cameras in Sweden, which are used as a safety device, not 
a revenue device. They explained that using such tools purposefully and with clear intentions, 
and without inflicting unnecessary harm on motorists, leads to much higher public acceptance. 
How to Sell It 
When asked about the best ways to sell the concept of congestion pricing politically and to the 
public, respondents emphasized clarity and transparency of intention.  
 
One New York planner noted that people “generally don’t like pricing,” so transparency about 
the policy’s true motivations is important. If policy makers were to try to sell something based 
on safety, and that’s the true motivation, that would be fine. But if that were not the true 
motivation, it would undermine the argument. Similarly, a London respondent emphasized the 
need to be honest about intentions, especially if there will be street space reallocated away from 
private vehicles. They noted that there has been some frustration in London as street space 
reallocation has kept congestion reduction from reaching optimal levels, even though the LCC 
was politically sold on the merits of its congestion reduction.  
Framing the Policy 
Where the money goes is also an element of selling the congestion pricing concept. If the money 
were to flow directly to safety projects and not be distributed to other sectors of government, said 
one planner, the issue of revenues might not get as much negative attention. A policy maker 
echoed this notion, noting that controversy in the 2008 congestion charging debate was largely 
over who would pay the fee, and where the revenue would go.  
 
Stockholm respondents also had a few ideas for New York. One suggested that, to create 
support, proposal advocates must find an angle that elicits positive emotions. “What can people 




associate with?” they asked. What can give them that “warm fuzzy feeling?” In Stockholm, the 
respondent explained, that angle was the environment, which was used as a platform on which 
pricing was pushed. Safety could be one of those elements, they said, if it elicits an emotional 
response from people and they connect with the need or desire for safer streets. 
 
Respondents also emphasized simple arguments. If you want to sell congestion charging to the 
public, one Stockholm respondent said, “you need soundbite-ready benefits, so you can’t just 
talk about congestion. It gets lost on the public.” Another respondent took note of the name, 
“congestion charging,” which focuses our thoughts, they said. The reason for the name is legal 
(it’s the name of the law), and the studies leading up to the formulation used this name, they 
stated, but it creates an almost self-fulfilling prophecy that the policy will focus on congestion. 
MoveNY 
New York advocates mentioned that one unique element of the MoveNY plan was its focus on 
equity, in its attempts to redistribute the burden of tolls that New Yorkers pay such that lower-
income commuters would not bear a disproportional burden. And, relevant to this research about 
safety, advocates also emphasized that the MoveNY plan expected to see street safety benefits in 
southeastern Queens and northwestern Brooklyn (and this is explicit in MoveNY’s Fair Toll 
Plan, 2015) as a result of declining vehicle volumes and specifically the phenomenon of “toll 
shopping,” in which drivers divert away from the most direct route in order to use one of the free 
East River bridges and thus avoid paying a toll. Toll shopping often takes private and 
commercial vehicles through small neighborhood streets in Manhattan’s Lower East Side and the 
aforementioned Queens and Brooklyn neighborhoods, making those streets more dangerous and 
disproportionately affecting lower-income residents. Both this equity issue and the associated 
safety equity issue presented by toll shopping, advocates suggested, could be a unique angle for 
“selling” a congestion pricing plan that intends to reduce toll shopping. 
 
Interview respondents were not optimistic about the latest revival of the 2008 New York City 
congestion pricing proposal, the New York Fair Plan presented by the MoveNY coalition, with 




one planner commenting that it would be fruitless simply because “the Governor is against it.” 
Another respondent, an advocate, opined that the current MoveNY campaign may be the last 
chance for the plan in its present form, since it is difficult to keep a committed coalition together 
for so long (from 2008 through the present) and through so many defeats, and since “the binary 
nature of MoveNY (you either pay, or you don’t, depending on where you’re going) makes it not 
entirely fair,”” and the world is moving away from binary structures like this as technology and 
complexity develop in transportation systems. 
 
Advocates noted that MoveNY would only redirect a tiny proportion of traffic in New York City, 
leveraging a 6-7% reduction in Vehicle Miles Travelled in the affected area to achieve a roughly 
15% reduction in congestion, and those reductions were associated with a reduction in crashes, 
fatalities, and serious injuries especially in southwestern Queens and northwestern Brooklyn, 
where the biggest congestion improvements would occur. While the respondent was 
disappointed that the MoveNY plan projections did not predict a higher level of safety benefits, 
they commented that alas, it was not intended to do so, but may be able to accomplish that 
purpose if it were structured differently. 
Survey Responses 
Eleven survey responses were mixed between New York and Stockholm respondents, and 
largely confirmed the perspectives expressed in interviews. They indicated that for most 
professionals, street safety and congestion pricing are simply not closely linked. Notably, though, 
for a few respondents, that link was quite evident. 
 
Survey respondents felt that safety was not an important impact of congestion pricing, in 
personal opinion, in discourse and in practice; congestion relief, revenue creation, and travel time 
improvement were rated as more important and more valuable impacts. However, a few 
respondents acknowledged safety as a benefit of pricing and an element of the discourse, with 
two to three respondents rating street safety impacts as a four or above (five being the most 




important or most prevalent) in each of personal opinion, discourse, and demonstrated 
effectiveness. 
 
Similarly, survey respondents felt that congestion pricing was not a significant method for 
creating safer streets; traffic calming, improved bicycle and pedestrian facilities, and reducing 
vehicle speeds were seen as the primary methods for improving safety. While congestion pricing 
did not seem to play a major part in street safety work for most respondents, two respondents 
rated congestion pricing as a four out of five (five being most important or most prevalent) in the 
importance or prevalence of the concept, in each of personal opinion, discourse, and practice. 
Congestion reduction, meanwhile, had very mixed reviews as a method for improving safety, 
perhaps reflecting some of the confusion mentioned above as to whether congestion makes for 
safer or more dangerous streets. 
 
Analysis 
There are some observations that emerge from these findings in the academic literature, the 
public discourse, and the professional discourse, and this analysis will attempt to dissect those 
observations categorically.  
Academic Literature Analysis 
Methodologies 
A few different methodologies were used in the literature to establish a connection between 
congestion pricing and safety. Noland et. al. (2008) used a binomial regression methodology to 
correlate crashes to the congestion charge in London. But the two primary types of studies to 
connect congestion pricing and safety directly are social welfare analysis and difference-in-
difference.  
 




Social welfare analysis includes reduction in automobile crashes as a social benefit of congestion 
pricing. This methodology incorporates an analysis of crashes before and after the 
implementation of a charging scheme, as an element of a social welfare/cost-benefit analysis, as 
in Parry and Bento (2002), Leape (2006), Rich and Nielsen (2007), Eliasson (2008, 2009), and 
Green et. al. (2016). TfL, too, included it in their cost-benefit analysis in 2006. In this social 
cost-benefit literature, the findings unanimously correlate congestion pricing positively with 
safer streets. 
 
The social cost-benefit methodology assigns a social cost to road crashes, often incorporating 
costs of casualties, including pain, grief, and suffering as well as lost output and medical costs, 
and in some cases the costs of responding to and clearing crash locations. Eliasson (2016) argues 
that the social cost-benefit model is useful because it uses already available traffic data, simply 
translating that data into monetary value to allow for comparison between externalities that are 
otherwise not comparable, and is the best method when there’s not a long time series. He notes 
that at this point, after 10 years of the congestion charge in Stockholm, there is enough time and 
data to do a longitudinal study, but this has yet to happen. 
 
Two different styles of difference-in-difference models were also used. The first was a 
comparison of the treatment area to one control city (at a time) as in Li et. al. (2012). The second 
was a comparison of the treatment area to many control cities at once as in Green et. al. (2016). 
Green et. al. found that, in the process of weighting the twenty cities to which they would 
compare London’s casualties, the optimal weighting scheme included all the cities. This leads 
them to argue that the multi-city comparison is superior to the single-city comparison as used by 
Li et. al.  
 
Rich and Nielsen (2007) caution against the general problems of assuming transferability of a 
congestion pricing implementation between cities. Existing levels of congestion, geography, and 
the quality and reach of the public transit system all play significant confounding roles. For 
example, their model for congestion pricing in Copenhagen may be difficult to transfer to other 




cities, given that the overall congestion level in Copenhagen was moderate to begin with 
compared to other European cities of a similar size. Moreover, most studies of the impacts of 
congestion pricing evaluate the immediate and short-term impacts of implementation; long-term 
effects are not always clear, assuming that dynamic city conditions like traffic levels will 
continue to change and that travelers will adapt and in the long-run optimize their travel choices. 
 
In both cases, separating the effects of the congestion pricing scheme from confounding 
variables related to ongoing street safety improvement projects and policies is a significant 
methodological hurdle. Both Li et. al. and Green et. al. note that London in particular, and the 
U.K. in general, have increasingly implemented safety policy and interventions that have 
doubtless led to reductions in crashes and casualties. The difference-in-difference method itself 
(by comparing the treatment area to a similar area(s) in terms of policy and interventions), the 
inclusion of national crash and casualty trends into statistical modelling for both treatment and 
control cities, and a number of other co-variates by Li et. al. and Green et. al. are intended to take 
these policy and intervention realities into account. 
Trends 
There are few academic articles exploring the link between congestion pricing and street safety. 
Many come to weak or inconclusive conclusions. All of the statistical analyses examine the 
LCC, with a few other articles discussing Stockholm’s system, a few that discuss congestion 
pricing generally, and one that seeks to make projections about a potential Copenhagen pricing 
scheme. With the exception of Green et. al. (2016), the literature is largely produced between 
2004 and 2012, when the London and Stockholm congestion pricing schemes were newly 
implemented. As Eliasson (2016) commented, that literature does not have the benefit of a 
substantial time series, and perhaps the inconclusive nature of many of the existing articles 
reflect this lack of sufficient data.  
 
The work of Green et. al. (2016), published twelve years after the implementation of the LCC, 
represents the first comprehensive look at the relationship between congestion pricing and safety, 




and might be understood as the beginning (should interest in the topic persist) of literature that 
takes advantage of a robust and lengthy series of datasets. 
 
Of relevance to this paper, in the literature there is very little mention of the discourse about 
congestion pricing and safety. Most authors discuss previous literature, and some allude to 
existing understandings or established arguments. Litman (2012) discusses how advocates and 
planners of bike and pedestrian transportation systems seldom highlight traffic safety as a benefit 
of congestion pricing. But apart from that, there is no examination of the discourse directly, of 
the common understandings, arguments, and disagreements in the field, nor of the different 
understandings of the congestion pricing-safety link in the academic, public, or professional 
realms of discourse.  
Interpretation 
From this literature, we can make both indirect and direct connections between congestion 
pricing and safety.  
 
The two-step, indirect connection is as follows: congestion pricing leads to reduced congestion, 
and reduced congestion leads to fewer crashes, thus congestion pricing may lead to fewer 
crashes. There is abundant literature linking pricing to reduction of congestion, finding that 
congestion pricing and congestion reduction are positively correlated. Meanwhile, some 
literature links reduction of congestion to safer streets. These findings mostly find a positive 
relationship: less congestion is seen to be positively linked to safer streets. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, there are many studies making a direct link between congestion 
pricing and street safety. These articles have mixed results. Some point to an apparent paradox of 
declining vehicle volumes but increasing bicycle crashes (although this may be the simple result 
of increasing bicycle trips, suggesting that the rate of bicycle crashes does not increase). But the 
most robust among them, most notably Li et. al. (2012) and Green et. al. (2016), attempt to 
disaggregate the safety effects of congestion pricing from concurrent safety measures (like slow 




zones, speed cameras, public transit investments, education campaigns, and improved pedestrian 
and bike facilities) to isolate the impact of a pricing scheme, and build upon earlier research to 
point to a strong positive relationship between pricing and safety. 
 
Green et. al. particularly provide a strong case, for three reasons. First, the methodology is more 
advanced and thorough than any previous study, using not one but twenty control cities to 
attempt to control for trends in street safety improvements and traffic calming. Second, the 
authors explicitly respond to many of the issues and assumptions raised in previous literature - 
for example, the notion that bicyclists are adversely affected by pricing, or that higher average 
speeds lead to fewer but more serious crashes - and in each and every case convincingly 
demonstrate that the LCC has led to safer, not more dangerous, conditions. Third, the study 
demonstrates a strong pricing-safety relationship from a myriad of different angles - most 
notably, increased safety in spillover times, areas, and modes; and crash decreases in both 
volume and rate.  
 
In assessing the aggregate findings from the academic literature, we may observe that as studies 
have become more methodologically and categorically robust, and had access to more substantial 
data, their findings have increasingly indicated that congestion pricing is associated with safer 
streets; and their conclusions to that effect have grown stronger in evidence and conviction. 
While the evidence is still mixed, we may reasonably conclude that congestion pricing advocates 
could justifiably use safety benefits as an argument for pricing implementation. 
Public Discourse Analysis 
Although discussion of safety and pricing together were generally not very common in the public 
discourse (and, in line with the findings, this analysis will pertain primarily to the public 
discourse of New York City), the content reviewed above is substantial and provides an 
opportunity for understanding the patterns and trends present in the discourse. An analysis of 
patterns in the contextualization of congestion pricing finds traffic, politics, and economics to be 
the three primary frameworks for discussion, incorporating connections to concurrent political 




and economic events to understand how the timing of articles affect their perspective. A look at 
trends in the discourse follows the 2000-2015 chronology (see Table 1), discovering that 
discussion has become increasingly intelligent and fact-based. 
Patterns of Context 
The advocacy literature on congestion pricing in New York City tends to focus on three things: 
traffic, politics, and economics. As the concept of congestion pricing became public knowledge 
around 2006, it was primarily discussed in the context of New Yorkers’ outrage at traffic 
conditions in the city. At this time, safety first enters the conversation, lumped in as one of many 
externalities such as pollution, road rage, lost time, and other generalized assumptions of the 
costs of congestion. It is not often put in the spotlight. In a few cases, environmental impacts are 
put in the spotlight, as with Komanoff’s (2007) comparison of the “ironclad” economic logic that 
makes congestion pricing and a carbon tax similarly desirable environmental policies. But 
notably, a few times safety gets special mention, as in Curiel (2006) and Naparstek (2206 
Weinshall in Stockholm).  
 
Starting in late 2006, peaking in 2008, and beginning to fade out of the conversation by 2013 are 
articles focused on politics, causing a small spike in the literature related to safety as well (Figure 
13). News articles follow the political machinations of congestion pricing positions and 
proposals related to the Bloomberg proposal and its attempted reincarnations. The vast majority 
of headlines on the topic express variations on the theme of political loggerheads and the 
infeasibility of passing New York City legislation through the New York State legislature.  
 
Planners and economists who look to insert some reality into the debate focus almost exclusively 
on congestion reduction as an end in itself or, later on, when the country entered recession and 
the Metropolitan Transit Agency (MTA)’s budget became an issue of enormous public debate, as 
a means to develop new revenue streams. From 2008 through the present, the topic of revenues 
becomes the primary talking point in the congestion pricing discourse. The conversation does not 
address street safety in response to any particular events or contexts. That is, until 2015, when 




the conversation shifts toward safety in response to the Lancaster University study about 
London’s congestion charge. That shift in discourse is a bellwether of an emerging attention to 
data and academic research to guide discussion on the topic. 
Trends 
In recent years the public discourse has become more voluminous (see Table 2), and more 
knowledgeable on congestion pricing and safety, increasingly drawing on quantitative analysis 
and academic research to determine whether congestion pricing can have positive effects on 
safety on city streets - and in many cases, to make the case that indeed it does. Though research 
from TfL (2007) has indicated since the first years of London’s Congestion Charge (LCC) that 
collision and fatality rates were falling in the charging zone, and academic literature has 
similarly provided evidence of a link between pricing and safety, that knowledge has been slow 
to translate into public discourse.  
 
Former London mayor Ken Livingstone’s aforementioned 2007 op-ed in the New York Times, 
perhaps surprisingly, does not even mention safety. But vehicle crash data and fatality data, often 
unreliable and in small sample sizes, frequently do not yield significant results without the 
availability of an extended time-series. Since London’s congestion charge was only four years 
old at the time, perhaps Livingstone’s (and many others’) reticence to incorporate safety into his 
arguments for pricing in New York was the result of a lack of sufficient research on the topic.  
 
It was not until 2013 that we see fact-based and research-oriented arguments begin to emerge. 
Charles Komanoff (2013) cites TfL’s traffic casualty data in arguing that London’s streets have 
become safer as a result of the LCC, noting that all the LCC revenue going toward street safety 
projects doesn’t hurt. For two years, Komanoff seems to be on his own, publishing several 
articles using established data or his Balanced Transportation Analyzer in an attempt to argue 
that pricing could lead to safer streets. A potential concern here is the echo chamber effect - that 
Komanoff’s work, in constituting such a high proportion of the content mentioned here, is 
representative more of the perspective of a single advocate than of a developing consensus. 





By 2015, the Lancaster University white paper is published, and both the academically-oriented 
and mainstream media catch on, using the paper as a foundation to sudden discuss pricing and 
safety in much more certain terms. The U.K.’s Royal Economic Society proclaims that the LCC 
“has made roads safer for all.” A headline in The Guardian declares that London’s congestion 
charge had led to a “dramatic fall in accidents.” The article noted that according to the study, the 
city had seen a “40 per cent drop in traffic accidents since 2003.” And Streetsblog, too, sees the 
significance, with Komanoff (2015b) referring to the study results as the congestion charge’s 
“street safety bonus.” 
 
The discourse about congestion pricing and street safety in New York City does not provide a 
large sample size, and though it has seen fluctuations in media and public discourse attention 
(see Figure 3), in the past year it certainly trended upward in volume as well as validity. Whether 
that trend continues remains to be seen, but it seems likely that the conversation will continue for 
New Yorkers as they contemplate how to solve a myriad of transportation challenges, safety 
among them, on the city’s streets. 
Professional Discourse Analysis 
London 
In London, conversation about safety in the discourse of congestion pricing is minimal, 
according to interview responses, though decreasing crash rates and reclaimed street space offer 
hope among respondents that the LCC has positively affected street safety. Meanwhile, the LCC 
reports continue to keep safety at least ostensibly integrated into the pricing conversation. 
 
Through 2006, the LCC reports’ analysis of crashes and safety impacts becomes increasingly 
robust and appear to be given more importance in their discussion and placement in the reports. 
By 2007 and 2008, safety impacts seem to be taken as something of a given, and the LCC reports 




primarily discuss safety benefits of the congestion charge as the continuation of previously 
established crash reduction trends.  
 
Though this assumption of safety as a “given” comes into play in 2007 and 2008, the reports 
decline to identify safety as a primary impact or social opportunity for the congestion charge. 
Perhaps this is because the claim would not be strong enough, or the data not substantial enough. 
Green et. al. (2016) argue that the logic behind the claim of social benefit via crash reduction is 
shaky (per the research of Shefer and Rietveld, Ashenfelter and Greenstone, and Wang et. al.) 
and although the reports give significant depth of analysis to the topic, they eschew any strong 
judgments on the value of the charge as a safety tool, at times naming the short time series of 
data available at the time as an obstacle. While ample evidence is provided displaying reductions 
in collisions across categories, the report shies away from definitively declaring that those 
reductions are the result of the charge. 
Stockholm 
In Stockholm, street safety is not really a part of the conversation about congestion pricing 
among transportation planners and engineers, though safety is frequently assumed to be an added 
benefit of pricing. Likewise for safety advocates or planners with congestion pricing, in the 
conversation about making streets safer. The primary purpose of congestion pricing, in most 
Stockholm professionals’ perspective, has been to reduce congestion, and secondarily to raise 
revenue. 
New York City 
In New York City, congestion pricing has not been a significant topic of conversation since 
2008. But in conversations with advocates, planners, academics, and policy makers, it was 
evident that pricing is an issue that, for at least a small group of transportation professionals, 
remains relevant. In response to questions that targeted the respondents’ view about the observed 
impacts, and potential safety benefits, of congestion pricing, several themes emerged: congestion 
and speed, and how they impact safety; opportunities to reclaim space or change the 




“transportation paradigm;” and how to sell congestion pricing politically and to the public. 
Responding to specific questions about the MoveNY proposal or the prospect of a safety-focused 
congestion pricing policy in New York, respondents were in favor of the concepts in theory, but 
skeptical that an opportunity for implementation would present itself anytime in the near future, 
citing political gridlock in New York City and at the state level. 
 
New York also appears to have a small but dedicated group of advocates that continue to push 
the conversation about pricing, and several of whom advocate for potential safety impacts. 
 
Discussion 
We can make broader conclusions about patterns that developed across geographies and 
contexts. These conclusions and the attendant proposals of this research are discussed below. To 
understand how these proposals might be implemented (or why not), we will then discuss the 
various challenges and opportunities that might present themselves in trying to implement these 
proposals. The arc of the below conclusions, along with challenges, opportunities, and 
subsequent proposals are illustrated in Figure 18, below. Lastly, this discussion will examine the 
implications of this research for congestion pricing and safety advocates, and make 
recommendations for further research. 
Conclusions and Proposals 
The first conclusion is that, if we are to generalize these findings, the discourse around 
congestion pricing and safety seems to be trending in the direction of understanding safety to be 
a more important and more valuable aspect of congestion pricing’s effects than previously 
understood. It is possible that the academic community has leapt ahead in advancing this 
understanding, with the professional and public conversations lagging behind. 
 
The second conclusion is a paradox of assumptions. The idea that safety might be a positive 
impact of congestion pricing, and perhaps a significant one, seems to be commonly agreed upon 




and often even assumed, in the academic and professional realms. Yet it has gotten little formal 
attention or analysis in the way that other positive externalities, such as air quality, have 
received. This seems curious given the attention brought to street safety by the recent popularity 
of Vision Zero, and in combination with the previous observation about a discourse trending 
toward greater significance of safety as an effect of pricing, this presents the opportunity for the 
first overarching proposal of this research: that the discourse of congestion pricing and the 
discourse of street safety be integrated. 
 
The third conclusion is that pricing mechanisms simply are not designed to achieve safety 
outcomes - even though many sources suggest that they could be designed as such. This leads us 
to the second overarching proposal of this research: that congestion pricing (optimally in 
combination with various other road pricing techniques but at the very least a cordon-style 
congestion pricing scheme) be advocated and implemented as a safety policy within the Vision 
Zero policy framework.  
 




Figure 18: Findings and proposal flowchart.
 





The many different perspectives (and several common misunderstandings) around congestion 
pricing and safety, as well as typical obstacles to implementation, and the current context of 
discourse about street safety, lend themselves to discussion of a number of challenges and 
opportunities for the prospective integration of safety into the discourse of pricing and 
implementation of pricing as a safety policy.  
Challenges 
Challenges include concerns about data and methods reliability; the different needs and effects of 
pricing in different policy and implementation contexts; disagreement over the relationship 
between congestion, speed, and danger; and the practical necessities of “selling” the concept 
politically and to the public. These challenges may serve as obstacles to this research itself, and 
may be understood as the limitations of this paper. 
Data and Methods Reliability 
When measuring the safety impacts of a congestion pricing scheme, crash and casualty data 
come from various sources. As of 2005 in London, most collision data comes from the 
Metropolitan Police (Transport for London 2005), and is delivered to TfL’s London Road Safety 
Unit. As of 2016 in London, Green et. al. (2016) use road accident data for all jurisdictions in 
Britain from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) that contain 
all motor vehicle accidents reported to the police from 2000 to 2009. Multiple respondents also 
noted that hospital data is usually combined with police data to assess truer numbers of 
casualties, and the task of waiting for and reconciling these data both prolongs and complicates 
the task. 
 
There is also a significant methodological challenge, as discussed above, in separating the 
change caused by pricing from change caused by external factors (as dealt with in Transport for 
London 2005). Confounding factors such as traffic management programs (Santos 2008), other 




safety initiatives, and wider street safety trends can make it difficult to ascertain exactly how 
much of a reduction in crashes or casualties was due to congestion pricing or to other factors.  
 
Lastly, the reliability of the findings explored in this paper may be tenuous. While we may sense 
a mood shifting toward the importance of safety in congestion pricing among the public and 
professional spheres, that shift is relatively recent, brief, and certainly subjective. And while we 
may identify increasingly robust evidence of the impact of congestion pricing on safety in the 
academic realm, that identification is based primarily on two conclusive articles and a slew of 
less conclusive ones. This last point represents this paper’s true leap of faith: the assumption that 
congestion pricing leads to safer streets, and that the evidence for such is increasing.  
Different Contexts, Different Impacts 
Attention to and understanding of safety and congestion pricing is not the same across cities, nor 
is the city upon which a pricing scheme is implemented, making local context important in 
understanding the value of an integrated congestion pricing/safety framework.  
 
In Sweden, where Vision Zero is has been an institutionalized policy since 1997, there was 
surprisingly little consensus understanding of how congestion in general, and congestion pricing 
in particular, impacts safety. While interview respondents were engaged in the topics separately, 
any responses having to do with safety impacts of congestion pricing were, with some 
exceptions, largely speculative. 
 
Meanwhile, in London, the impression comes across of a better-informed planning community.  
This is based on the fact that crash analysis related to the LCC is readily available, while 
academic and public literature have both seemed to give at least some attention to the linkage 
between pricing and safety. It is likely that TfL’s commitment to tracking safety outcomes has to 
do with its agency mission and responsibilities. As an agency that oversees the full breadth of 
London transportation planning, TfL is responsible for monitoring street safety and making 
streets safer, and has the capacity to track and analyze the requisite data. Thus TfL may 




incorporate safety into its congestion charge reporting as a matter of considering the LCC’s 
impacts across the range of its agency responsibilities. This suggests that the power and scope of 
the agency contribute to its attention to safety within the LCC – and that in other cities perhaps 
an agency with similar breadth of control over the transportation system would be more potent in 
analyzing the pricing-safety relationship. 
 
In New York City, such an agency does not exist, with a gamut of agencies including the 
Department of Transportation, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the Port Authority 
of New York and New Jersey controlling various parts of the city’s transportation infrastructure. 
Now with Vision Zero in its second year in New York City, the city is moving toward a goal of 
zero deaths and serious injuries on city streets but not quickly enough to reach zero any time 
soon. While the City has numerous Vision Zero initiatives, congestion pricing is not among 
them. But with a congestion pricing concept gaining broad support in the city (before its failure 
to pass in Albany) in 2008, perhaps MoveNY could present a way to reduce traffic crashes and 
move toward zero. MoveNY’s Fair Plan claims that it will, namely by reducing vehicle traffic 
and eliminating “toll shopping” that may cause drivers to cut through city streets to reach free 
bridge crossings.  
 
The attention around this proposal, combined with written and interview respondents’ skepticism 
as to its fate, may be an opportunity for safety to enter the conversation in a deeper way. At the 
same time, we must understand that safety benefits of MoveNY are projections, and we cannot 
expect that the scheme would see the same safety improvements as London or Stockholm - 
because the city, and the policy, is different. Politics can play a critical role as well, since, for 
example, what was politically possible in London in 2003 was not possible in 2008 in New York 
City.  
 
The actual or proposed pricing policy, too, plays a major role in the value of its safety benefits. 
Numerous interview respondents indicated that the value of a congestion pricing scheme to street 




safety ends depends largely on the policy itself and the way that the scheme is designed and 
implemented.  
Congestion = Safety? It Depends 
There was significant disagreement in this research as to whether congestion makes streets safer 
or more dangerous, and ultimately it probably depends on context, in a couple of important ways.  
 
First is what we mean when we say “congestion” - the way in which we measure and 
conceptualize the term. Although ultimately it incorporates both, in most cases, congestion 
seems to be understood visually as either a phenomenon of speed, or a phenomenon of volume. 
In the perspective of both the expert and the lay person, it depends whom you ask.  
 
In the academic and traffic engineering lexicon, congestion generally means inconvenience to 
drivers caused by having to slow down. Often it has been measured in hours of delay per trip as a 
result of slow downs, or by various similar measures, which exclusively value a driver’s time in 
navigating the street network from origin to destination. (The response from engineers often has 
been to try to increase both speed and volume capacity of streets.) This perspective will usually 
not take into account congestion’s impact on vulnerable street users, but when that impact has 
been measured, conclusions have been mixed, as discussed above.  
 
In the literature, congestion may also be understood as volume of vehicles. Green et. al. (2016) 
speculate that less congestion may translate into fewer crashes, since for uncharged vehicles in 
London’s CCZ the crash rate decreases. They see this as a function of fewer vehicles on the road, 
making the odds of an accident reduce for any given vehicle regardless of whether it was 
charged, a hypothesis echoed by Noland (2008) in earlier research. Many interview respondents 
similarly expressed the opinion that congestion pricing, simply by reducing traffic volumes, 
would reduce the probability of a vulnerable road user being struck by a vehicle and would thus 
effect safer streets. This reasoning makes the “lower volume, lower crash risk” assumption. 
 




But street safety advocates, planners, and community members may be likely to conceptualize 
congestion from a pedestrian or cyclist’s viewpoint. For people in intensely urban neighborhoods 
(such as the charging zones in Stockholm and London, and the proposed charging zone in 
Manhattan) this conceptualization may resemble gridlock such as in Midtown Manhattan during 
rush hour - which often feels quite safe to navigate as a pedestrian because vehicles are hardly 
moving - and interview respondents who are safety advocates or work in street safety often 
expressed a similar conceptualization in arguing that congestion improves safety for pedestrians. 
This viewpoint assumes “higher volume, lower crash risk.”  
 
Alternatively, for people in less intensely urban neighborhoods (such as those outside the 
charging zones in Stockholm, London, and New York City), their conceptualization of 
congestion may resemble surging arterials like Queens Boulevard at rush hour - an impenetrable 
column of speeding cars, enormous traffic volumes, and a daunting pedestrian environment - the 
antithesis of street safety. This perspective assumes that more volume leads to more danger and 
thus reflects the aforementioned “lower volume, lower crash risk” assumption. 
 
The second element of context in understanding congestion is the way in which congestion is 
managed. If a congestion pricing scheme aims to reduce congestion by increasing average traffic 
speeds, for example, that does not necessarily indicate that vehicles are moving at more 
dangerous speeds. Many interview respondents who have worked with congestion pricing 
technical theory or implementation indicated that pricing optimally causes traffic flows to be 
smoothed, not accelerated, such that instances of stop-and-go for drivers are reduced, and 
average speeds increase but maximum speeds do not. Other respondents indicated that, 
depending on how the pricing is implemented and the street safety measures that do or do not 
accompany it (such as speed limits, traffic calming, etc.) pricing’s congestion reduction effects 
may indeed lead to higher speeds and more dangerous streets. 
 
Thus from both a traffic engineering perspective and a community perspective, congestion may 
indeed be seen by some as beneficial to street safety. An argument that planners should thus 




deliberately allow congestion to continue, however, is, if nothing else, fallacious in its rhetoric, 
because it would certainly seem absurd to argue that congestion should be the tool we use to 
make streets safer. New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan understood as much in 1991 
when he told the Senate Subcommittee on Water Resources, Transportation, and Infrastructure 
that he had “begun to understand that congestion is a pricing mechanism. It is a very negative 
pricing mechanism, all you do is lose from it” (U.S. Senate Hearing, 1991).  
 
Ultimately, the consensus among the literature and those interviewed seems to show a pattern 
whereby the more recent literature and the more expert interview respondents understand 
congestion reduction, insofar as it reduces vehicle volumes and thus reduces the odds of 
collisions, has a significantly net benefit for street safety. This implies that congestion reduction 
is a valid means by which to achieve safer streets. 
How to Sell It 
With both London and Stockholm’s congestion charges, as well as the failure of New York 
City’s 2008 proposal, politics and public opinion played a major role. And across the literature 
and in interviews, it was clear that any congestion pricing policy ultimately must come to terms 
with its viability in the political context and the public eye. And the same would go for any 
pricing policy that aimed to integrate safety into its campaign. It must be sold. 
 
Suggestions for overcoming this obstacle range from the single-topic push (e.g. the 
environmental credo of Stockholm’s Green Party); engaging the triumvirate of data, logic, and 
emotion; and balancing the “hard sell” with building trust.   
 
The environmental lens is how Stockholm’s pricing advocates made their pitch, arguing that 
pricing would lead to substantial environmental and air quality benefits (primarily by negating 
the need for new highways) and it was effective in mobilizing support that had not previously 
been present. One might think of safety as an issue that can similarly rouse widespread support, 




though one interview respondent cautioned that safety can be something of a passive issue for 
the public - everyone supports it, but no one wants to do anything about it.  
 
Data, logic, and emotion are one way to conceptualize a campaign for a policy, and interview 
respondents noted that while data and logic are often discussed, and form the foundations of 
arguments for or against pricing, in the academic or planning realms, they may not work when 
convincing politicians or community members. In this sense, just as congestion reduction data 
can be underwhelming to the layperson, people might not get excited about a congestion pricing 
policy that purports to reduce vehicle crashes by a certain number or garner a certain dollar 
amount in revenues for safety projects.  
 
In the case of people who are not likely to be swayed by data and logic, one respondent advised, 
one must use “the emotional sell.” This requires balancing the hard sell of economic or practical 
benefits with the building of public trust and transparency, the latter of which is often cited as a 
critical failure of the 2008 Bloomberg proposal. The emotional sell, for an integrated congestion 
pricing and safety policy framework, might have elements that resemble Vision Zero campaigns 
today - personal, graphic reminders of what is lost when safety is not a priority on city streets. 
Opportunities 
While there are clear challenges to an integrated discourse framework for pricing and safety, and 
the implementation of pricing as a safety initiative, it is apparent that there are opportunities as 
well, that could make these concepts a reasonable, perhaps even necessary, proposal. 
 
These opportunities include the non-linear relationship of decreasing traffic volumes and crashes, 
by which the rate of crashes and casualties decreases; the positive spillover externalities in terms 
of area, time, and mode; the opportunity to reclaim space on city streets and direct new revenue 
toward safety projects; the opportunity to alter the transportation paradigm such that people 
reconceptualize and reprioritize the ways in which they get around the city; and the opportunity 




to match the overlapping goals of congestion pricing advocates and new frameworks for safety 
policy (i.e. Vision Zero) to produce a congestion pricing proposal as a safety initiative. 
Positive Safety Outcomes 
Non-linearity 
Congestion effects of pricing are commonly understood to be non-linear, in that a reduction in 
traffic volumes leads to an even greater reduction in congestion, and this is often one of the 
primary economical arguments made on behalf of congestion pricing.  
 
Previous research had proposed that such a non-linear impact could be possible for crash rates, 
too. Green et. al. (2016) discuss the need to study the rate of crashes per mile driven to determine 
whether pricing has more than a linear impact, in the context of other efforts to study the rate of 
change of congestion pricing impacts. Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006) suggest that a reduction 
of driving by one percent ought to decrease crashes by more than one percent. And though there 
was some disagreement from interview respondents as to the possibility of non-linearity, the 
respondents who predicted a linear relationship admitted that the prediction was speculative. 
Most recently, the findings from Green et. al. (2016) demonstrate conclusively that crash and 
casualty rates decrease.  
 
Assuming these findings are maintained in the coming years, the decreasing rate of crashes and 
casualties as a result of congestion pricing presents a tremendous opportunity. It means that the 
very same thing about that makes economists so emphatic about the value of congestion pricing - 
a non-linear impact on congestion - is also true of safety. What we do not know, from the 
literature, is at what point this non-linearity plateaus. But we may reasonably assume that if such 
non-linearity were to be applicable across urban contexts (the challenges of that assumption, of 
course, being discussed above), then we might assume that a city like New York, should it 
implement some form of congestion pricing, might stand to see a reduction in vehicle crashes 




and casualties far greater than the reduction in traffic volumes. This suggests that the safety 
impacts of pricing may be larger in scale than commonly understood. 
Spillovers 
Although a common concern as to a congestion pricing scheme’s effects on safety (and likewise 
on congestion) have to do with negative spillover effects, the LCC reports from TfL have 
consistently demonstrated that there is no foundation for those concerns, especially when it 
comes to the areas and transport networks immediately surrounding the charging zone. There 
have proven to be no increases in crashes nor casualties outside the charging zone. 
 
Furthermore, Green et. al. argue strongly that spillover effects are positive. They demonstrate 
that safety gains in one category (e.g. within the CCZ) are not balanced out or substituted for by 
losses in another category (e.g. outside the charging zone) – and moreover, that those other 
categories also see gains. The congestion charging scheme seems to cause safer streets for all 
road users, at all times, everywhere near the charging zone. This is important, because it 
indicates that the safety impacts of pricing may in fact be larger in scope than commonly 
understood. 
Reclaimed Space, Claimed Revenue 
Reclaimed Space 
Another opportunity is the possibility of redistributing street space away from vehicles, 
reclaiming space from the automobile to be used for other purposes. In the context of an 
integrated pricing and safety policy framework, this could mean anything from new dedicated 
bus lanes, to separated bicycle infrastructure, to pedestrian safety improvements such as wider 
sidewalks. This is a topic that saw great interest from interview respondents, with a couple of 
respondents indicating that street space reallocation held perhaps more potential than any other 
opportunity for making streets safer in a congestion pricing scheme. 
 




The premise of this opportunity is based on the reduction of vehicle volumes in a congestion 
pricing scheme, and a resulting decline in need for vehicle capacity. This decline in need for 
vehicle capacity may make reallocation (for example, taking away a vehicle traffic lane to install 
a dedicated bus lane) more feasible both in a practical sense and in a political sense. That is, the 
traffic engineers may be on board because they don’t need to fit as many cars through a network, 
and politicians and community members may be on board because they no longer perceive the 
need for road capacity to be as urgent. Politicians may come to understand safe street designs as 
no longer having such a debilitatingly “high political cost,” as one interview respondent put it, 
and be more willing to advocate for safer designs. 
 
This premise is presented above as a hypothetical, because there is no data that tells us to what 
degree volume reductions would make reallocation easier or more feasible. But interview 
respondents were generally quite optimistic that this is in fact the case, and in both London and 
Stockholm, reallocating space to people traveling in safer modes than the private automobile is 
certainly not only hypothetical. With congestion less of a problem in the city centers of London 
and Stockholm, there is less fear that reducing street capacity will debilitate the city. As such, the 
political opposition to such reallocation has been weak, further enabling implementation. 
 
These reallocations have been effective. London saw immediate ridership and performance 
improvements as a result of allocating new street capacity to the bus system, including a 6% 
modal shift to buses, with a 9% speed increase overall. In a simulated “typical” U.S. city 
implementing a similar congestion charge, these increases were 30% and 9%, respectively 
(Small 2005), indicating that such benefits for bus travel may be transferrable across the Atlantic.  
 
Persuading travelers to switch to transit, walking, and bicycling, and providing better and higher-
capacity facilities for those modes, may be desirable from the perspective of a transportation 
planner, but in the context of this research, it may be safer as well.  
 




Green et. al. (2016) express initial concern about the unknown safety effects of increased use of 
non-charged modes (e.g. walking, bicycling, using transit, or motorcycles) in the regions 
immediately surrounding London’s CCZ, especially considering the immediate increase in 
bicycle casualties after the implementation of the charge. But their findings indicate that in these 
“spillover” areas, in the medium- and long-term, casualty rates decreased significantly, 
suggesting that the change of modes, even the change to bicycles, did not make streets more 
dangerous. In fact, casualties among these other modes decreased in spite of an increase in the 
number of trips. The authors speculate that the immediate and brief uptick in bicycle casualties 
may have been the result of inexperienced cyclists taking to their bicycles to avoid the 
congestion charge; as for the inverse relationship of trips to casualties in non-charged modes, 
they speculate that those modes became safer as a result of the reduced traffic volumes and thus 
fewer interactions with cars and trucks. 
 
And the opportunity to provide more bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure may, itself, have a 
non-linear impact. Assuming greater numbers of pedestrians and cyclists under a congestion 
pricing scheme (as in London and Stockholm, and projected by Rich and Nielsen (2007) in their 
model for a cordon charge in Copenhagen, such that there would be a 4.3% regional increase in 
bicycle trips and a 2.5% regional increase in pedestrian trips) and with the provision of more 
facilities for those modes, pedestrians and bicyclists may find themselves less vulnerable than 
before. This increase in pedestrian and bicyclist numbers could result in a decrease in casualties, 
due to the “safety in numbers” phenomenon - the idea that pedestrians and bicyclists are safer in 
greater quantity, as documented in Elvik and Bjørnskau (2015)). This safety in numbers effect 
may resemble, for largely separate reasons, the broader decreasing casualty rates that Green et. 
al. were so emphatic about. This is important because it may mean that the more trips that 
convert to pedestrian or bicycle modes as a result of congestion pricing, and the more street 
space that is reallocated to serve them, the safer everyone will be. 





We may take the above argument to mean that simply by implementing congestion pricing and 
then reallocating some of the resulting underutilized space, we can make streets safer. Of course, 
the practical problem arises of finding money to fund those changes - but this is where 
congestion pricing again may be a worthy companion for street safety policies, because pricing 
can produce that revenue and, indeed, in London 11% of revenues are specifically designated for 
“safety” projects. In the U.S., there is some precedent for new road network fees being 
reinvested into safety projects in Seattle, where speed camera revenue is invested exclusively in 
street safety projects. 
 
What are the other practical hurdles involved in directing congestion pricing revenues to safety 
projects?  
 
As with the “revenue question” of congestion pricing in general, it is politically important to be 
clear about the destination and purpose of the revenue to maintain transparency and avoid false 
assumptions about who will get the revenue. This could become an ever-more important question 
as transportation policy and administration continue to devolve in the US and Europe. With cities 
increasingly wondering where transportation funding is coming from, the prospect of turning to 
revenue-producing transportation systems becomes more popular.  
 
While some early congestion pricing proponents have suggested on occasion that revenue should 
go toward expanding road capacity for vehicles (Fitch LC 1964), the consensus among interview 
respondents indicated a clear preference for three destinations: existing roadway maintenance 
and repair, transit service, and bicycle and pedestrian facilities. Even the literature that does not 
acknowledge any connection between congestion pricing and safer streets indicates that public 
transit is one of several primary objectives of congestion pricing (Falcocchio and Levinson 
2015). 
 




In particular, the dire need of the current New York City bus system, which faces budget 
shortfalls as well as operational deficiencies such as slow trip times, presents an opportunity. To 
divert both new street space and new revenue to the city bus system, as London has done, could 
restore New York’s bus system to reliable, high-quality service that is less subject to the gridlock 
of the city’s most congested areas. Those kinds of changes would be likely to draw new ridership 
and, if we assume bus modes to be safer for everyone than private vehicle modes, would thus 
make streets safer. 
Changing the Transportation Paradigm 
It is possible, many interview respondents agreed, that congestion pricing plays a role in 
changing the very way in which people think about transportation. We will discuss how pricing 
can effect culture change, how pricing can be implemented as a tool for social change, and how 
other pricing mechanisms might complement congestion pricing for maximum paradigm-
changing and safety-inducing impact. 
Culture Change 
The culture shift that Vision Zero and other safety advocates push for is also reflected in the 
change in mentality that planners see as a result of congestion pricing. Multiple interviewees 
expressed the opinion that apart from the obvious congestion and revenue benefits, the most 
practical impact of pricing has been its ability to change the way that people think about driving 
and vehicle infrastructure. One Stockholm planner, suggested it be deliberately used in that way, 
referring to congestion pricing as a “a pedagogical instrument that challenges the idea that cars 
are the only way to get around.”   
 
As people conceive of driving as a more high-cost activity under a pricing scheme, their 
valuation of and approach to driving as a daily activity is likely to change. This mentality shift is 
borne out in numerous behavioral changes, but may mean something of a paradigm shift in 
attitudes as well, with drivers no longer enjoying the luxury of always being the top priority in 
the transportation system. 





The potential to change behavior and attitudes is a phenomenon that one Stockholm respondent 
observed at a fast pace over the course of the Stockholm trial, with the effect of people not only 
driving less, but also driving differently. Multiple respondents indicated that trip reliability plays 
a big role in when, where, and how drivers choose to drive - and higher trip reliability is a key 
outcome of congestion pricing schemes. We might reasonably assume that if drivers can take 
more reliable routes and are less worried about getting somewhere on time, their driving attitude 
may change - relax, perhaps, become less aggressive. Being stuck in traffic certainly never 
helped anyone calm down.  
 
Culture of non-drivers might change as well. A plethora of research has examined associations 
between perceived or actual traffic safety and behavioral outcomes like walking and cycling, and 
perceived and actual traffic safety concerns have been shown to be positively associated with 
walking behaviors. The perception of danger on streets is a deterrent to pedestrian and cyclist 
activity (Cho et. al. 2009). Knowing that many people equate congestion with danger (as 
discussed above), reduced congestion may lead to an urban environment that is more conducive 
to walking and bicycling. Mackie (2005), for example, notes that TfL does not account for the 
potential of Central London becoming a more pleasant local environment, and suggests that it do 
so. (TfL has indeed done so in more recent LCC reports.) 
Implementation - Pricing as Engineering Tool vs. Agent for Social Impact 
Pricing is often understood as an engineering tool, one used to address specific and pressing 
problems. A practical problem is identified, and pricing is applied as a policy solution. It changes 
traffic flows to improve throughput. It produces revenue to fill budget shortfalls. It reduces 
traffic volume to reduce air pollution. It is perceived as a solution to practical engineering 
problems. Budget problems. Emission problems.  
 
But as with all widely applied urban policies, pricing can have broader social implications. If we 
can understand that congestion pricing also operates on this social end of the spectrum, perhaps 




the policy can be created in such a way as to appropriately account for or even deliberately 
address those social impacts.  
 
Perhaps it can be implemented with the intention to not only address practical traffic, revenue, or 
pollution problems, but also to change attitudes and understandings of our transportation system 
and the micro-scale choices that define it on a day to day basis by clarifying and imposing on 
drivers at least some of the true cost of their choices. Perhaps it can be implemented in part as a 
statement of priority, the higher costs applied to drivers (compared to other modes) understood 
as not only a disincentive but a declaration that henceforth vehicles will not enjoy privileged 
status, that they will occupy a new place at the bottom of the transportation mode hierarchy. 
 
If we can understand pricing in this nuanced way, as this dual engineering tool and political or 
social statement, then perhaps the paradigm change will not be so subtle - and that may be more 
powerful than any engineering tool or political statement alone. 
 
Interview subjects emphasized that while, to some, it is still not evident that pricing has an 
immediate and obvious impact on street safety, it is a crucially important step in ending the 
uncontested reign of vehicles on city streets. That reign has been present in the discourse of 
twentieth century planning and manifested itself on actual street space allocation. So if pricing 
can, as many policy-makers have suggested, lead to a fundamental change of direction in how 
we discuss and allocate space on streets, that in itself is a valuable outcome for advocates of safe 
and livable streets who face stiff opposition as they seek to reclaim street space from 
automobiles and redistribute it to people.  
Other Pricing Mechanisms 
If we assume that the primary safety impact of congestion pricing is taking cars off the road, then 
we may assume that the pricing of driving in other ways can also make streets safer. Parking 
pricing, Vehicle Miles Traveled pricing, and other demand-management methods are all known 
to have the ability to reduce vehicle traffic volumes (Litman 2012, Robin 2010).  





If they were to be combined with a cordon-style congestion pricing model in a holistic system 
that makes drivers pay for driving roughly according to the value of the space they take up and 
the value loss that they inflict on other road users, safety gains may be more substantial than just 
a cordon-style congestion pricing scheme alone. 
Overlapping Goals 
Do congestion pricing and street safety planning have overlapping goals? Could they seek 
mutual gain? If there ever was a time to seek such overlap, it is now. The era of Vision Zero has 
portended new significance for street safety policy, and a wide diversity of initiatives have 
resulted. The following selection of initiatives associated with Vision Zero, undertaken by the 
City of New York in the past two years, illustrates the breadth of topics that Vision Zero reaches 
across (City of New York 2016). 
 
● Pedestrian safety improvements 
● Street lighting upgrades 
● City vehicle upgrades 
● A speed limit reduction campaign 
● A Driving While Intoxicated campaign 
● Taxi cab in-vehicle data collection boxes 
● Bicycle network expansion 
● Off-hours commercial deliveries programs 
● Testing and implementation of new traffic enforcement models 
 
What if we added congestion pricing to that list? Vision Zero could be a potent political angle for 
the congestion pricing policy advocate. 




A Timely Political Angle 
Applying timely political angles to the argument for congestion pricing has a precedent in the 
environmental movement. According to several Stockholm interview respondents, the argument 
that a congestion charge would reduce emissions and lead to significant environmental benefit 
became the catalyst for the coalescing of environmentally-minded and Green Party elected 
officials around support for the congestion charge. The concept was even initially referred to as 
“environmental fees.” That environmentally-motivated base of support was ultimately a primary 
political driving force behind the successful implementation of the Stockholm trial.  
 
Of course one must be wary of implying that the connection is more robust than it is. The 
MoveNY advocate Charles Komanoff warns of over-reliance on such a tenuous connection in his 
2010 article “With Congestion Pricing, Saving Time Trumps Reducing Pollution,” arguing that 
the benefit of reduced emissions in a prospective New York City congestion pricing scheme will 
be dwarfed by travel time savings. “Give the ‘green’ angle a rest,” he says, since curing drivers’ 
aggravation should be “motivation enough” for a congestion pricing system. 
 
Does the same reasoning apply to street safety? In terms of impacts, perhaps. But in terms of 
timeliness, perhaps not.  
 
As for impacts, the jury still seems to be out on determining conclusively whether there are 
definitive safety benefits from congestion pricing - though the sympathetic evidence appears to 
be mounting, with Green et.al.’s “Traffic Accidents and the London Congestion Charge” (2016) 
providing clues as to how, when, where, and for whom those benefits accrue. If we assume that 
the evidence linking pricing to safety benefits is growing in volume and certainty (and this 
paper’s findings suggest that it is), then pricing may soon become objectively good policy for 
fostering safer streets. 
 
As for timeliness, the moment may be prime. While the environmental movement may have 
evolved toward broader goals than just air pollution in recent years, the street safety movement 




by comparison is much newer, and may still need small victories like congestion pricing that, if 
implemented widely, could go a long way toward many of the goals that Vision Zero policies 
and safety advocates desire. Safety is a powerful motivator in London and Stockholm policy, 
according to one interview respondent with experience in implementation of both London’s and 
Stockholm’s congestion charges, who added that New York is just now beginning to see similar 
safety-motivated policy. 
 
The urgency of saving lives could bring a powerful new rhetoric to arguments for pricing. That 
urgency has been leveraged to make street safety a front-and-center claim for policy change with 
other Vision Zero projects in the last couple of years (such as street redesign and traffic calming, 
truck side guards, and improved bicycle and pedestrian facilities), and could likewise provide a 
convincing rationale for congestion pricing. 
Policy Goals and Implementation 
Ultimately, the degree to which pricing can influence safety will come down to its goals and its 
implementation.  
 
One could surmise that a pricing scheme devoted exclusively to congestion relief, or to revenue 
production, or to air pollution reduction will be unlikely to result in more than marginal safety 
improvements. But what if the goals of the pricing scheme were adjusted to align with Vision 
Zero? What if the goal was street safety? 
 
When asked about the most significant impacts of road pricing in general, a common refrain 
from congestion pricing experts in Stockholm, London and New York has been “it depends on 
the implementation.” That is, congestion pricing can be a powerful tool, and if it is implemented 
with the intention of reducing congestion, it will likely do so. Ditto for producing revenue or 
reducing emissions. The MoveNY proposal, with a deliberate focus on transportation equity, 
may well be able to improve equity outcomes. If a proposal were designed and implemented with 
the intention of improving street safety, this suggests - and a handful of policy makers in 




Stockholm and New York agreed with this reasoning - it could likely have a significant impact 
on safety. 
 
To illustrate this concept in a provocative way, imagine making pricing a new central initiative 
of New York City’s Vision Zero framework. Imagine changing the nomenclature: “safety 
pricing.” The implementation, prioritizing safety above all else, might include: 
 
● A cordon-style safety pricing system (technologically modeled roughly after London and 
Stockholm’s congestion charge) explicitly designed to:  
○ Reduce traffic volumes on the most dangerous streets and intersections (usually 
arterials and busy pedestrian crossings), especially during the most dangerous 
times (for example, late at night). 
○ Reduce traffic volumes of the most dangerous vehicle types. 
● Excess street space (due to reduced traffic volumes) expressly reallocated to Vision Zero 
pedestrian, bicycle, and transit safety projects. 
● All safety pricing revenues invested in Vision Zero street safety projects. 
● Integration of the cordon-style system with other road pricing mechanisms such as 
Vehicle Miles Traveled fees and comprehensive pricing for parking, likewise 
implemented with street safety as the primary goal, to create a holistic and wide-reaching 
safety pricing system and achieve maximum safety improvements. 
 
Perhaps the vision for pricing on roads has been too narrow, too dominated by traffic engineers 
with their hyper-focus on vehicle movement efficiency, or too dominated by politicians and their 
hyper-focus on finding new revenue streams. Pricing has proven to be a very powerful tool, 
capable of effecting behavior change en masse. If it can be adapted for use as an effective safety 
tool, should that trump its use as a congestion or revenue tool? If the average New Yorker could 
choose how to put that tool to use, would they choose vehicle movement efficiency? Would they 
choose City revenue? Or would they choose saving lives?  
 




Perhaps it’s time to put road pricing to a new use. 
Implications 
The aforementioned findings, challenges, opportunities, and proposals for an integrated 
congestion pricing and safety policy framework present potential implications for street safety 
and congestion pricing planners and advocates, especially in New York City where it is unclear 
whether congestion pricing stands a realistic chance of implementation in the near future. 
Safety Advocates and Congestion Pricing Advocates 
Advocates for street safety might consider adopting congestion pricing as a means to safer 
streets. In New York City in particular, this might mean planners and advocacy organizations 
contributing greater marketing, policy, or organizing resources toward congestion pricing 
campaigns such as MoveNY. New York advocacy groups like Transportation Alternatives and 
Riders’ Alliance, which already support MoveNY’s Fair Plan, might consider integrating and 
even prioritizing the proposal in their advocacy efforts.  
 
This approach may dilute messaging for advocacy groups that have more immediate priorities, 
like pushing for the implementation of street safety infrastructure. Congestion pricing is a longer-
term solution and more indirect solution to safety needs, and could represent a risky expenditure 
of political capital considering its history of contentiousness. Why advocate for congestion 
pricing when its actual implementation is highly uncertain – even doubtful – and its impacts on 
safety less certain than more established concepts like traffic calming, speed reduction, and 
bicycle lanes? 
 
But pushing the proposal primarily on the grounds of safety, as a Vision Zero initiative, may 
foster more support than the tired old revenue-and-congestion angles that failed to garner 
sufficient public support in 2008. Safety may already be an element of the message: a recent 
email from Transportation Alternatives to its members, in response to MoveNY being brought 




before the State legislature in recent weeks, declared that MoveNY would “reduce congestion, 
improve public transit and make biking and walking safer” (White 2016). In this instance, 
prioritizing that argument about safety and de-emphasizing the arguments about revenue and 
congestion may reframe the way that people think about congestion pricing and how they 
consider its merits. For advocacy groups whose mission and membership is highly invested in 
Vision Zero, using this safety angle could be powerful. Groups like Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving and, more recently, the nationwide distracted driving campaign and the New York crash 
victim group Families for Safe Streets, have demonstrated that street safety can be an issue that 
resonates powerfully with the public in ways that congestion relief and government revenues, as 
some interview respondents noted, do not seem to. And in the process they may be proving that 
safety is not, as one interview respondent warned, an issue that “everyone supports” but “no one 
wants to do anything about.” Indeed, these groups often use the “emotional sell” that some 
respondents advocated, and bringing that emotional element to the table could make for a more 
persuasive argument than the cut-and-dry congestion and revenue arguments. 
 
It may carry more weight politically, too, for example with Mayor de Blasio, who has not given 
his support to MoveNY but for whom Vision Zero was and continues to be a major policy 
agenda item. The same may be true for the street safety-oriented political action committee 
StreetsPAC, which supports twenty-one current New York City elected officials. StreetsPAC has 
not yet taken an official position on MoveNY, though its support for parking pricing and 
regulation reform and its assertion that such reform would move the city “closer to achieving 
Vision Zero” (McClure 2016) suggests that it may be open to the concept that pricing can lead to 
safety. 
 
As for New York State Governor Cuomo, whose indifference to congestion pricing in New York 
City was cited by numerous interview respondents as a primary obstacle to the policy’s 
implementation, the impact of reframing pricing as a Vision Zero initiative is less clear. His 
approval of a reduced speed limit for New York City in 2014 indicated that he is at least open to 
the concept of broad-scale transportation policy change in service to Vision Zero. 





Stockholm’s Green Party was successful in mobilizing new support for the congestion charge by 
pushing the environmental angle. The MoveNY campaign itself may find a new audience if it 
attunes its messaging – and perhaps even the Fair Plan proposal itself – to prioritize safety. 
MoveNY’s development and promotion of the equity benefits of its proposal was largely in 
response to criticism of the negative potential equity impacts of the 2008 proposal. If a new 
proposal were developed around safety outcomes, the Fair Plan might find itself predicting safer 
streets (as many interview respondents argued would be likely for any pricing scheme 
deliberately crafted to increase safety), and perhaps reduced benefits for congestion relief and 
revenue production. But if these trade-offs resulted in broader public and political acceptance for 
MoveNY because safety was more marketable, the proposal change could be worthwhile. 
Transportation Planners 
Planners, like advocates, may have the opportunity to connect these two often-sought goals of 
pricing and safety more closely for a better chance of success.  
 
The decreased traffic of a cordon-style congestion pricing scheme implemented in a safety policy 
framework may have political and practical implications for transportation planners, by making 
the reclaiming of street space to allocate toward safer, less-auto-oriented infrastructure simpler 
while providing opportunities for traffic volume reduction, modal shift, and a shift of the 
transportation paradigm – all of which provide opportunities for safer streets. Transportation 
planners may be able to take advantage of these opportunities to implement safety projects on a 
larger scale or on faster timelines. 
 
Meanwhile, Vision Zero safety planners with the City of New York (for example, at the 
Department of Transportation or the Mayor’s Office) and the broader network of associated 
City-facilitated programs and initiatives throughout New York City could consider adoption of 
congestion pricing as a policy goal of Vision Zero. This would be a bold new addition to the 
Vision Zero agenda. Again, the question of political capital arises. Would the addition of 




MoveNY or another congestion pricing proposal to the Vision Zero agenda be worth a potential 
political battle, considering the significant opposition to the 2008 proposal? Why risk the relative 
success of New York’s Vision Zero thus far by bringing in a contentious and uncertain new 
agenda item? 
 
But the addition of congestion pricing to the Vision Zero policy agenda could garner new 
support for MoveNY from historically opposed or ambivalent groups. The Taxi and Limosine 
Commission and the NYPD, for example, are official members of the Vision Zero Action Plan. 
If they were to support MoveNY as a Vision Zero policy, it would be a big win for pricing 
advocates.  
 
For Vision Zero planners, though, as for advocates, it may all come down to effectiveness. Can 
congestion pricing really make a demonstrable impact on street safety outcomes? This thesis 
suggests that it can, but that claim may need to be buffeted by further evidence – be it through 
case studies from other cities, or network models for New York’s prospective scheme. Thus the 
importance of further research, for which several recommendations are made below. 
Further Research 
There are various opportunities for further research, but perhaps the most immediate is for 
further research into the impact of congestion pricing on safety in Stockholm. The research of 
Green et. al. with London’s Congestion Charge, made possible largely by the length of time that 
has elapsed since the LCC was introduced, may soon be replicable in Stockholm as we approach 
the tenth anniversary of that system’s implementation. In particular, the following steps may be 
useful: utilizing a difference-in-difference or similar methodology to most effectively isolate the 
impacts of congestion charging in Stockholm from other geographic, economic, or policy 
variables that also impact street safety; investigating potential spillover effects in Stockholm in 
response to frequent concerns about impacts of charging on non-charged areas, modes, and 
times; and determining not only changes in crash and casualty quantities but also rates. 
 




TfL has proven the capacity to effectively monitor the wide-ranging effects and outcomes of the 
LCC, but the agency has not published a full report on the topic since 2008. Doing so may clarify 
some of the longer-range effects of the charge, and in building on their 2004-2008 reports may 
elucidate more clearly, and with much more recent and relevant data, the positive safety trends 
that earlier reports had begun to see. The Swedish Transport Agency could also benefit from 
publishing a similar report, especially following the recent expansion of the congestion charging 
zone and increase in fares, to try to understand the effects of the charge throughout the city and 
particularly on safety, which is a powerful and important topic in Vision Zero’s country of 
origin. Such reports, if made available in English, would also provide a valuable case study for 
cities in the U.S. that are grappling with Vision Zero implementation alongside some pressure to 
explore broader road pricing initiatives. 
 
American congestion pricing research may benefit from understanding what the projected safety 
effects of congestion pricing might be in a city like New York City. MoveNY and the Balanced 
Transportation Analyzer offer early projections, but further research could elucidate additional 
evidence and also project safety impacts of a variety of pricing models or implementations – for 
example, what would the safety effects be of a pricing system that was designed and 
implemented with the primary goal of reducing crashes and casualties? Lastly, research could 
explore the public and political acceptability effects of framing congestion pricing proposals 
around different primary objectives. For example, what would New York City’s current public 
and political acceptability for congestion pricing look like if the proposal were framed around 
congestion relief? Revenue? Equity (as in MoveNY)? Street safety? 
 
 





Appendix A: Interview Subjects 
 
Interviews were conducted between December 2015 and April 2016 with the following 
professionals:  
 
Elenore Bjelke, Traffic Planner for City of Stockholm. January 13, 2016, in-person. 
Hans Brattstrom, Stockholm County Council. January 12, 2016, via email. 
William Carry, Senior Director for Special Projects, Office of the Deputy Commissioner for 
Policy, NYC Department of Transportation. March 8, 2016, via telephone. 
Amy DiCarlantonio, Urban Planner at Ecology & Environment and former researcher for Gehl 
Architects’ 2003 London Public Space Survey. April 12, 2016, via telephone. 
Lars Ekman, PhD in Traffic Safety, Sweden Trafikverket. January 22, 2016, via telephone. 
Jonas Eliasson, Professor of Transport Systems Analysis at the Royal Institute of Technology, 
Stockholm, and Head of the Division of Transport Planning, Economics and Engineering at 
the Department of Transport Science. January 15, 2016, in-person. 
Daniel Firth, Chief Strategy Officer, City of Stockholm Department of Transportation, and 
former consultant for Transport for London. April 7, 2016, via telephone. 
Karin Freij-Brundell, WSP Global planning consultants. January 14, 2016, via telephone. 
Kyle Gebhart, Transit Development Department at the NYC Department of Transportation. 
February 24, 2016, via telephone. 
Colin Green, Professor of Economics at Lancaster University, UK. January 19, 2016, via 
telephone. 
Birger Hook, Project Lead for the Stockholm Congestion Charge for Sweden Trafikverket. 
January 13, 2016, via telephone. 
Karolina Isaksson, Transportation Researcher at the Swedish National Road and Transport 
Research Institute and the Royal Institute of Technology. January 29, 2016, via telephone. 




Steve Kearns, Stakeholder Manager in the Technology Delivery Group, and former London 
Congestion Charge Planner, at Transport for London. April 12, 2016, via telephone. 
Charles Komanoff, Director of the Carbon Tax Center and analyst for the MoveNY Fair Toll 
Plan. March 3, 2016, in-person. 
Conny Lemon, Independent Consultant advising municipalities about street safety. January 12, 
2016, in-person. 
Mattias Lundberg, Head of Traffic Planning for the City of Stockholm. January 13, 2016, in-
person. 
Julia Kite, Research and Policy Manager, and Serena McIntosh, Research and Data Coordinator, 
Transportation Alternatives. March 18, 2016, in-person. 
David Metz, Honorary Staff at Center for Transport Studies at University College London and 
author of the book Peak Car. January 28, 2015, via telephone. 
Magnus Nilsson, Independent Consultant, and former advocate for congestion charging with the 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation. January 29, 2016, via telephone. 
Robert Noland, Professor of Transportation Planning and Policy and Director of the Alan M. 
Voorhees Traansportation Center at the E.J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, 
Rutgers University. February 4, 2016, via telephone. 
Jon Orcutt, Advocacy and Communications Director of TransitCenter, a New York City urban 
transportation non-profit. February 10, 2016, via telephone. 
Isak Rubensson, Strategic Development Analyst at Stockholm County Council. February 4, 
2016, via telephone. 
Bruce Schaller, Independent Consultant and former Traffic and Planning Commissioner at NYC 
Department of Transportation. February 10, 2016, via telephone. 




Appendix B: Interview Question Template 
 
This interview is being conducted by Andrew Lassiter as part of a Master’s thesis in Urban 
Planning at Columbia University in the City of New York. Names, titles and agency or 




3. Agency or organization: 
 
4. How familiar are you with the concept of congestion pricing for city streets? 
5. Are you able to list some examples of congestion pricing for city streets? 
6. Do you work with congestion pricing research or policy? If so, in what capacity? 
7. Have you been involved in the implementation of congestion pricing? 
8. In your estimation, what does congestion pricing do best? 
9. What are the primary elements of the agenda for implementing congestion pricing 
(i.e., what are the arguments made to justify it)? 
 
10. Do you work with street safety research or policy? If so, in what capacity? 
11. Do you perceive street safety to be an important element of the impacts of 
congestion pricing on city streets? 
12. Is this perception shared among your peers? 
13. Do you perceive congestion pricing on city streets to be a valuable method for 
increasing safety? 
14. Is this perception shared among your peers? 
15. Do you know if there has been an impact on street safety since the introduction of 
congestion pricing? 
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